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ABSTRACT 
 
We develop a unified growth theory with Industrious Selection to explain the Five 
Revolutions in the development process (Agricultural Revolution, Structural Transformation, 
Industrial Revolution, Industrious Revolution, Demographic Revolution) and the Two Divergences 
in Eurasia (Little Divergence, Great Divergence) in AD0-AD2000.  Industrious Selection refers 
to industrious (hardworking and cooperative) individuals gradually dominating the population 
composition through labor-leisure optimization and income effect on births.  It raises working 
hours, improves production efficiency and accelerates development.  The Black Death expedited 
Industrious Selection in late-Medieval Europe.  Together with the population scale effect, the 
theory reconciles the British development process and Eurasian economic divergence during 
AD0-AD2000. 
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“Always there must have been, and always there must continue to be, a survival of the 
fittest … [A]mong the civilized human races, the equilibration becomes mainly direct”. 
(Herbert Spencer 1864, 468) 
 
“[F]rom the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are 
capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows.” 
(Charles Darwin 1876[1872], 429) 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Ever since Adam Smith (1994[1776])’s inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of 
nations, how to account for the historical economic development and divergence across nations 
has always been at the center of the disciplines of politics and economics.  This paper puts 
forward that Industrious Selection, a natural selection mechanism originating from human 
conscious optimization behavior, is a central component to reconcile Eurasian economic history 
within a unified growth framework.2  In particular, we develop a unified growth theory with 
Industrious Selection to explain: (1) how an economy transits from its Malthusian stagnating state 
to one with sustainable growth, and to reconcile temporally developmental revolutions during the 
transition process: the Agricultural Revolution, Structural Transformation, the Industrial 
Revolution, the Industrious Revolution, and the Demographic Revolution; and (2) why there have 
been divergences in economic performance between Britain and Continental Europe, between the 
East and the West, and between the North and the South in Eurasia throughout history. 
Our research contributes to the literature on unified growth theories.  Unified growth 
theories aim to explain the transition of an economy from Malthusian stagnation, which 
characterizes most of human history, to one with sustainable growth, which has been observed in 
developed countries over the past 200 years.  Most unified growth theories put emphasis on 
explaining long-run output and fertility behavior.  Two pioneering works are Galor and Weil 
(2000) and Galor and Moav (2002)’s papers.  Galor and Weil (2000) proposed that the inherent 
positive interaction between population size and technology level in the Malthusian era would 
accelerate technological progress and permit a takeoff to the Post-Malthusian era.  The 
accelerated technological progress would also raise demand for human capital and ultimately 
trigger a fertility decline, opening up the Modern Growth era.  Galor and Moav (2002) introduced 
household heterogeneity in preference with regard to child quality versus quantity.  Households 
who care more about child quality would have an evolutionary advantage during the Malthusian 
era.  On the eve of the Industrial Revolution, the composition of this type of households in the 
population would rise to a sufficiently high level to sustain the pace of technological progress. 
A complete unified growth theory should be able to explain the development process from 
2 In this paper, the term “Eurasia” refers to Europe, Asia and Africa.  The theory developed in 
this paper applies to these regions but not to the American landscapes.  For the justification and 
construction of a unified growth theory for the Western Hemisphere (American UGT), see Ho 
(2016a). 
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both temporal and spatial perspectives.  What are missing in the literature are: first, sequence of 
developmental revolutions taking place around when the economy breaks out of the Malthusian 
regime (the sequence is namely the Agricultural Revolution, Structural Transformation, Industrial 
Revolution, Industrious Revolution, and Demographic Revolution).  This paper theorizes how 
these events are interrelated and sequenced.  Second, seldom have unified growth theories been 
set up to analyze the world economies comparatively.  This paper makes up for this aspect and 
uncovers the origin of economic divergences in Eurasia over the past two millennia. 
In the first part of the paper (sections 4-5), we show how a typical nation goes through the 
Five Revolutions (the Agricultural Revolution, Structural Transformation, Industrial Revolution, 
Industrious Revolution, and Demographic Revolution) in its development process.  We construct 
a unified growth model to grasp the stages of development.  The distinctive feature of our model 
is population heterogeneity: there are two types of individuals – one possesses the “industrious 
trait”, willing to supply more labor hours to the market (hardworking), and being better to solve 
coordination problems during the production process (cooperative).  Assuming the “industrious 
trait” is perfectly inheritable from parents to children, through consciously working harder, the 
more industrious individuals earn higher incomes than the less industrious ones; through an 
income effect on the number of births, the more industrious individuals will have an evolutionary 
advantage and gradually dominate the population composition (we call this “Industrious 
Selection”).  This will increase average working hours and production efficiency in the nation 
over time, and in turn expedite its growth and development. 
In the early stages of development, population growth dissipates the slow technological 
progress and renders the economy in a Malthusian Trap.  Production is concentrated in the 
agricultural sector to meet the food demand.  Through learning-by-doing, this allows agricultural 
technological progress to speed up and the Agricultural Revolution to occur first.  When 
agricultural productivity is high enough to feed the population, labor hours can be released from 
the agricultural sector and Structural Transformation takes place.  Over time, intensified 
production comes along with accelerated productivity growth, triggering per capita income takeoff 
or the Industrial Revolution.  The wage increase during the Industrial Revolution induces 
households to supply more labor hours and gives rise to the Industrious Revolution.  The 
continuous technological improvement and structural transformation in favor of the manufacturing 
sector will ultimately raise relative food price (the relative cost of child-rearing), triggering a 
Demographic Revolution.  Industrious Selection accelerates the above development process 
through evolutionary pressure, expediting the onset of the Five Revolutions.  With Industrious 
Selection, an economy takes off earlier than one devoid of such pressure.  We apply the model to 
simulate the British development process during AD0-AD2500, and illustrate the above 
mechanisms.  
In the second part of the paper (section 6), we turn to the question of the causes of the relative 
rise and fall of nations.  One crucial criticism of Galor and Weil (2000)’s paper is that, given the 
mechanism they proposed, Industrial Revolution should have first occurred in China, rather than in 
Britain, given its much larger population size throughout history (Clark 2014, 251).  Mokyr (1999) 
surveyed geographical, historical, technological, social, institutional, political, demand and supply, 
and trade factors that narrated the causes of the British Industrial Revolution; however, there was 
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no consensus on why the Industrial Revolution first took place in Britain.  Our unified growth 
theory will hold these factors constant, and argue that population composition is key to this issue.3  
We put forward that, on the eve of the British Industrial Revolution, Britain (or Europe) possessed 
a higher proportion of industrious individuals in her population than China did, and was therefore 
blessed with higher working hours, production efficiency and faster technological progress.  The 
critical event that gave rise to such a population structure was the Black Death during 
AD1346-AD1353.4  The Black Death relatively wiped out the poorer population (that is, the less 
industrious individuals in our theory), effectively speeding up Industrious Selection in Britain (or 
Europe).  The population composition that was more conducive to growth in Britain (or Europe) 
accounts for the origin of Little Divergence and Great Divergence (the Two Divergences) between 
the East and the West of Eurasia. 
Industrious Selection, together with population scale effect, also explains the closing of the 
East-West per capita income gap since the late-twentieth century, as well as the evolution of 
within-Europe and North-South income differences in Eurasia.  We conduct theory-based 
simulations to reconcile the divergence in economic performance among four nations/regions: 
Britain, Continental Europe, China and Africa over the past two millennia.5 
We proceed as follows: The next section reviews the relevant literature.  Section 3 describes 
the historical facts related to the Five Revolutions and Two Divergences.  Section 4 presents the 
theoretical model.  Section 5 applies the model to Britain and explains how the Five Revolutions 
arose during its development process.  Section 6 extends our analysis to the other parts of Eurasia.  
We recalibrate the model with the Black Death shock to account for the divergent growth paths 
among Britain, Continental Europe, China and Africa over the past two millennia.  Section 7 
highlights some points for discussion.  Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2 RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Our work is related to five bodies of literature.  The first set of literature is related to the 
Industrious Revolution.  According to De Vries (1994, 249), “[t]he industrious revolution was a 
process of household-based resource reallocation that increased both the supply of marketed 
commodities and labor and the demand for market-supplied goods.”  In this paper, we focus on 
the “increased supply of labor” aspect of the Industrious Revolution.  In Britain, the (average) 
3 We acknowledge the importance of the factors surveyed by Mokyr (1999) in explaining the 
British Industrial Revolution.  The key insight of this paper is that population size and 
composition alone are sufficient to qualitatively replicate historical development and divergence 
patterns throughout Eurasian economic history (section 7.5).  To make our model as simple as 
possible to bring out this insight, we ignore those factors surveyed by Mokyr (1999). 
4 We follow Benedictow (2004) to locate the Black Death in the years AD1346-AD1353.  The 
Black Death arrived at the Golden Horde in AD1346 (60).  By AD1353 it had reached most of 
the lands in Europe (xviii). 
5 In this paper, the term “Continental Europe” refers to the 11 Western European countries, except 
the United Kingdom, identified by Maddison (2008): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.  In comparison, the term 
“Europe” or “the West” refers to Britain and Continental Europe. 
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labor hours supply generally increased during the Modern Period (section 3.4).  Clark (2007, 181) 
stated that, “work hours were very high in England by 1800 … What exactly the transition to 
longer work hours took place is hard to establish … It is clear that the transition in England had 
largely occurred before the onset of the Industrial Revolution.  But work hours in medieval 
England were probably already high by forager standards”.  Given such evidence and the 
proliferation of labor-leisure tradeoff theories in modern macroeconomics (Becker 1965; Kydland 
and Prescott 1982), it is perhaps surprising that little research has combined the two to explain the 
onset of the Industrious Revolution.6  We will address this issue (sections 4 and 5). 
The second set of literature is the unified growth theories.  Unified growth theories explain 
how an economy evolves through a three-stage development process: from the Malthusian regime, 
through the Post-Malthusian regime, to the Modern Growth regime.  The literature started with 
Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002) (section 1), and has been extended along 
production and demography fronts.  For the production side, Hansen and Prescott (2002), Doepke 
(2004), Strulik and Weisdorf (2008) and Lagerlöf (2010) investigated unified growth theories with 
dual sectors: as long as technological progress in the Solow (less land-intensive) sector is fast 
enough compared to the Malthus (more land-intensive) sector, an economy will eventually break 
through the stagnating equilibrium where per capita income growth is bounded by the land 
constraint.  For the demography side, features such as child mortality (Lagerlöf 2003a), life 
expectancy (Cervellati and Sunde 2005), gender gap (Lagerlöf 2003b) and parental altruism 
(Soares 2005) have been added to the theories.7  However, in this literature, there was neither 
consideration for households’ choice on leisure nor comparative analysis to reconcile divergent 
long-term growth experience across the globe.8  We will fill these research gaps (sections 4 and 
6). 
The third body of literature is on how population size and composition affect growth (or 
income).  For population size, Kremer (1993a) suggested that a larger population size drives 
faster productivity advancement.  Whether productivity growth increases proportionately with 
population depends on whether the market size effect or the effort duplication effect dominates.  
For population composition, Kremer (1993b) proposed the O-ring production theory to explain 
income differences across countries: suppose production within a country can be broken down into 
complementary tasks, where workers’ quality cannot be substituted by quantity within each task.  
In equilibrium, assortative matching occurs: workers of similar quality are matched together in a 
country, and countries with better workers’ quality possess higher wages and incomes. Our paper 
will incorporate Kremer (1993a) and Kremer (1993b)’s formulations in a unified growth model, 
where population size and composition both affect productivity growth (section 4). 
6 One exception is Vollrath (2009)’s work.  He proposed a unified growth theory where the 
Industrious Revolution is a consequence of manufacturing productivity growth. 
7 See Galor (2005, 2010) for surveys on unified growth theories. 
8 For leisure, one exception is Galindev (2011), who assumed leisure has to be in concert with 
children and goods to yield utility.  In contrast to that approach, we model leisure as a component 
that directly enters household’s utility function (section 4).  For divergence, Galor (2010, 3) 
stated that, the unified growth theory “implies that differences in the timing of the takeoff from 
stagnation to growth across countries contributed to the divergence in income per capita across the 
globe”.  We will simulate this type of divergence dynamics (section 6). 
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The fourth body of literature is about structural transformation, which explains changes in 
production structures that accomplish growth and development.  Kongsamut et al. (2001) 
proposed that, with a nonhomothetic household preference, neutral technological progress shifts 
production inputs away from a sector with lower income elasticity of demand through the income 
effect.  Ngai and Pissarides (2007) posited that biased technological progress leads to sectoral 
shifts through the relative price effect.  In Ho (2016b), population growth induces factor 
movements across sectors with different degrees of diminishing returns to labor.  These papers 
assume homogenous households, and hold population growth rate exogenous to focus on different 
causes of structural transformation.  In this paper, we relax these assumptions to examine how the 
above channels explain demographic-economic development within a model framework with 
heterogeneous population and endogenous fertility (section 5).9 
The fifth body of literature employs theory-based simulations to shed light on the 
development and divergence issues.  Related to our work, economists have employed this 
technique to replicate Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002)’s three-stage 
development process (Lagerlöf 2006), to identify why Britain industrialized first (Voigtländer and 
Voth 2006), to trace out the causes of East-West Little Divergence (Voigtländer and Voth 2013a) 
and Great Divergence (Gollin et al. 2002, 2007) with different model frameworks.  Broadberry 
(2015) put forward that the Black Death shock, together with the Industrious Revolution in the 
North Sea area, was one of the causes accounting for the Two Divergences.10  In this paper, we 
take up the task of theorizing how the Black Death and labor-leisure tradeoff contributed to the 
developmental revolutions and economic divergences in Eurasia within a unified model 
framework (section 6). 
 
 
3 HISTORICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Sections 3.1-3.5 present historical evidence for the evolution of key economic and 
demographic variables related to the Five Revolutions during British development process.11  
Section 3.6 looks into the Little Divergence and Great Divergence issues. 
 
3.1 Agricultural Revolution 
The timing of Agricultural Revolution in Britain is still a much debated topic.  Earlier 
9  Another famous mechanism for structural transformation is the capital deepening effect 
(Acemoglu and Guerrieri 2008): capital deepening in the aggregate economy induces production 
factors to shift away from sectors with higher capital intensity.  This effect does not appear in our 
theory because we abstract from capital accumulation (section 4). 
10 Broadberry (2015) stated that, there are two key shocks (the Black Death in the mid-fourteenth 
century and the discovery of new trade routes in the late-fifteenth century) and three key structural 
factors (the extend of sectoral diversification, the nature of state institutions, and the quality and 
quantity of labor) that account for divergences in Europe and Asia.  Temin (2016, 38) also stated 
that the Black Death and the European discovery of America are the “big events of economic 
history”. 
11 Britain is chosen among many developed countries because of the rich sources of historical data 
and estimates available.  It was also the first industrializing country; Mokyr (1999, 127) dubbed it 
the “Holy Land of Industrialism”. 
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views among economic historians dated the British Agricultural Revolution in the late-eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth centuries (Toynbee 1894, 27; Ernle 1936, 149; Overton 1996, 206), arguing 
for the rapid growth of land and labor productivity confluent with the British Industrial Revolution.  
In the recent decades, revisionist historians argued that most of the agricultural productivity 
growth had occurred by the mid-eighteenth century (Jones 1965; Kerridge 1967, 15; Allen 1999).  
For example, Allen (2004, 116) stated that, British “agriculture had already revolutionised itself 
between 1600 and 1750 … In that period, yields, output and labour productivity all increased 
sharply … The agricultural revolution did not run concurrently with the industrial revolution but 
rather preceded it”. 
Figure 1A depicts Allen (2000)’s estimates of agricultural output per worker in England 
during AD1300-AD1800, and Figure 1B depicts Clark (2002)’s estimates of agricultural 
productivity in England during AD1500-AD1912.  In general agricultural productivity rose from 
AD1600 onwards, and came to a halt during the late-eighteenth century, and resumed its growth in 
the nineteenth century. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
3.2 Structural Transformation 
This paper focuses on one aspect of structural transformation: the reallocation of labor hours 
between agricultural and manufacturing sectors.  Figure 2 depicts Broadberry et al. (2013) and 
Clark (2010, 2013a)’s estimates of agricultural labor share in England during AD1381-AD1861.  
The former showed that agricultural-to-manufacturing transformation has occurred in Britain since 
the sixteenth century, while the latter indicated that this was the case only after the seventeenth 
century. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
We will investigate how the income effect (Kongsamut et al. 2001), relative price effect, 
technology growth effect (Ngai and Pissarides 2007) and population growth effect (Ho 2016b) 
fostered structural transformation (and other development patterns) in a model with heterogeneous 
population and endogenous fertility. 
 
3.3 Industrial Revolution 
The date of British Industrial Revolution is commonly set between AD1760 and AD1830 
(Ashton 1948).12  The period marked “[f]or the first time in history, the living standards of 
masses of ordinary people have begun to undergo sustained growth” (Lucas 2002, 109).  While 
the magnitude of the rise in living standard is still being debated, the optimistic and pessimistic 
parties both agreed that the real wages showed sustainable increases by the AD1820s (Lindert and 
Williamson 1983; Feinstein 1998; Clark 2005).  Figure 3A depicts Feinstein (1998) and Clark 
(2005)’s real wages estimates during AD1760-AD1870, with the indices being set to 100 in 
AD1860, to illustrate the above point.  From Clark (2010)’s estimates, average per capita income 
growth rate was 0.29% per annum in AD1760-AD1830. 
12 AD1769 was a hallmark year for British industrialization.  In that year three important 
machines were invented: the Spinning Jenny by James Hargreaves, the Water Frame by Richard 
Arkwright and the Steam Engine by James Watt. 
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INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
One important aspect of the Industrial Revolution is the decisive rise in productivity growth 
rate that allowed for sustainable per capita income growth.13  Figure 3B depicts Clark (2010)’s 
per capita income (solid line) and total factor productivity (dashed line) estimates in England from 
AD1200 to AD2000.  “[T]he upturn in productivity growth rates can be located to the 
1780s/1790s”, where such growth rates “increased from close to zero to close to 1% per year … 
within 50 years of 1800 in England” (Clark 2014, 217, 220). 
What was the engine of such productivity growth?  North (1981, 162) stated that 
“[l]earning by doing can explain the technology developed during the Industrial Revolution”.  
Similarly, Crafts (1995, 761) stated that during the British Industrial Revolution, “Arrow-like 
learning by doing was much more important relative to intentional, profit-seeking R&D than in 
today’s world”.  Our theory predicts that, Industrious Selection and the increase in average 
working hours intensified production and accelerated learning-by-doing during the Industrial 
Revolution. 
 
3.4 Industrious Revolution 
De Vries (2008, x) placed the Industrious Revolution in AD1650-AD1850.  One important 
aspect of the Industrious Revolution was the increase in (average) labor hours supply (section 2).  
Figure 4 depicts Allen and Weisdorf (2011)’s annual working days per person estimates in Britain 
during AD1433-AD1870, and De Vries (2008)’s estimates of female labor-force participation rates 
in the United Kingdom during AD1955-AD1999.  Both variables were generally increasing 
within their respective time frames, contributing to the increase in labor hours supply. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
Given that most economic variables in Britain were in stasis before the eighteenth century, 
we hypothesize that the increase in labor hours supply before the eighteenth century occurred as a 
result of Industrious Selection (demographic selection pressure against the less industrious 
individuals), rather than as a response to economic signals.  Thereafter further increase was 
mainly a reaction to the substantive wage increase since the Industrial Revolution. 
 
3.5 Demographic Revolution 
Fertility declined in Britain during the nineteenth century.  Figure 5 depicts the gross 
reproduction rate and net reproduction rate in England and Wales during AD1541-AD2008.14  
British fertility started its long-run decline in around AD1820. 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
13 Before the AD1980s, economic historians tended to consider the British Industrial Revolution 
as a wide-spread phenomenon and the overall productivity growth rate was high (McCloskey 1981; 
Feinstein 1981).  Crafts (1985), Crafts and Harley (1992), Harley (1999) made downward 
adjustments to the overall productivity growth rates and argued that the productivity growth was 
confined to some key manufacturing sectors and agriculture only.  See Mokyr (1999) and Clark 
(2014a) for surveys on the British Industrial Revolution. 
14 Gross reproduction rate is defined as the average number of daughters that would be born to a 
woman.  Net reproduction rate is defined as the average number of daughters that would be born 
to a woman and survive through her childbearing years. 
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 In the current literature, there are at least five explanations for the fertility decline: decline in 
mortality (Notestein 1976[1945]), increase in relative child cost (Lindert 1980), increase in female 
wage (Becker 1991[1981], 140), child quality-quantity tradeoff (Becker 1960), and old-age 
security hypothesis (Caldwell 1976).  The increase-in-relative-child-cost channel is potentially 
important to explain the British fertility decline during the early-nineteenth century.  One key 
child cost is the food price, the “ultimate check to population” (Malthus 1826, 12).15  Figure 6 
depicts Broadberry et al. (2011)’s estimated price of agriculture goods relative to industry goods in 
Britain during AD1270-AD1870.  In the early-nineteenth century there was a sharp rise in the 
relative agricultural price.  We hypothesize that this raised the relative child cost and triggered the 
Demographic Revolution. 
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE 
We deny mortality decline as a cause of fertility decline in the AD1820s.  Figure 7A depicts 
Chesnais (1992)’s estimates of crude birth rate (solid line) and crude death rate (dashed line) in 
England and Wales during AD1735-AD1984.16  Prior to the AD1820s, fertility and mortality 
were generally moving in opposite directions, rejecting mortality decline as a major cause of 
fertility decline. 
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE 
We also disregard child education investment and the resulting quality-quantity tradeoff as 
key factors responsible for the British fertility decline in the early-nineteenth century (Galor and 
Weil 2000; Lagerlöf 2006).  Figure 7B depicts Flora (1983)’s estimates of percentage of children 
aged 5 to 14 who enrolled in primary school in England and Wales during AD1855-AD1914.  
Although we do not have data for periods prior to AD1855, we conjecture that the enrolment rate 
had been staying below 10% throughout the first half of the nineteenth century.  Hence increasing 
education investment was likely not to be the primary cause for the British fertility decline in the 
AD1820s. 
 
3.6 Little Divergence and Great Divergence 
“Little Divergence” is the term used to describe the divergent economic performance 
occurring between northwest Europe and the rest of Europe, as well as between the northwest 
Europe and the East prior to AD1800.  Allen (2001) showed in early Modern European real 
wages study that between AD1600 and AD1800, England’s real wage rose slowly, while real 
wages of the other European countries declined or stagnated at best.  Broadberry and Gupta 
(2006) found that during the same time frame, the northwest European countries enjoyed higher 
silver wages than did China and India, which witnessed stagnation similar to the southern, central 
and eastern parts of Europe.17  In this paper, we prefer using per capita GDP to illustrate the Little 
15 Malthus (1826, 12) stated that, “[t]he ultimate check to population appears then to be a want of 
food, arising necessarily from the different ratios according to which population and food 
increase.” 
16 Crude birth rate is defined as the number of births per 1,000 population.  Crude death rate is 
defined as the number of deaths per 1,000 population. 
17 Allen (2001) and Broadberry and Gupta (2006) provided estimates for silver wages of building 
workers in leading European cities in Britain, Belgium, Netherlands, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, 
Austria and Poland during the early Modern Period. 
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Divergence.  The left panel in Table 1 displays Maddison (2008)’s per capita GDP estimates for 
Britain, Continental Europe, China and Africa in AD1, 1000, 1500, 1600, 1700 and 1820: per 
capita GDP grew faster in Britain than in Continental Europe throughout AD1500-AD1820, while 
China and Africa were stagnating within the same time frame. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 “Great Divergence” refers to the differential growth among nations after AD1800.  After 
AD1800 Western European countries and European offshoots grew sustainably, while other 
countries in the world either took off at later dates or stagnated.  Figure 8 depicts per capita GDP 
growth paths for some representative countries (Britain, France, Spain, the United States, China, 
India and Niger) during AD1700-AD2008.  European nations and the United States have 
displayed exponential growth since the nineteenth century, while China and India took off later 
during the twentieth century, and Niger is still stagnating today. 
INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE 
 
After reviewing the historical evidence, we set up the theoretical model in the next section.  
In sections 5 and 6, we will calibrate the model and simulate the British development process and 
across-nation divergence pattern in Eurasia that we have documented in this section. 
 
 
4 THE MODEL 
 
Consider a closed overlapping generation economy which continues over infinite discrete 
time periods, indexed by 𝑡𝑡 . 18   Households are heterogeneous, some of which are more 
hardworking (valuing less for leisure) and at the same time more cooperative (better at solving 
coordination problems during production process).  We lump them together as the “industrious 
trait”.  The “industrious trait” is perfectly inherited across generations.19  There are two sectors 
in the economy: the agricultural and manufacturing sectors; the former produces food for 
child-rearing while the latter produces manufacturing goods for adult consumption. 
 
4.1 Households 
There are two types of identical households in the economy.  Households are indexed by 𝑖𝑖, 
where 𝑖𝑖 = 1 represents the “more industrious individuals”, who possess the “industrious trait”, 
and 𝑖𝑖 = 2 represents the “less industrious individuals”, who do not possess the “industrious trait”.  
18 Our model is an extension of Strulik and Weisdorf (2008)’s one, by allowing for household 
heterogeneity, labor-leisure tradeoff, and coordination problems during the production process.  
Strulik and Weisdorf (2008) constructed a unified growth theory which could account for Four 
Revolutions (the Agricultural Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, Structural Transformation and 
the Demographic Revolution) during a country’s development process. 
19 Clark (2008, 186) concluded from regression analysis that “in pre-industrial England economic 
success was highly hereditable, and that this was mainly because the children of the rich differed 
genetically or culturally from the general population”.  We hypothesize the “industrious trait” as 
one such “highly hereditable” genetic or cultural difference among different types of population.  
Relatedly, Clark (2013b, 2014b) argued that genetics (biological inheritance of abilities) is the 
main determinant of social position/economic success. 
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Let 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1 and 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2 be their respective adult population size at time 𝑡𝑡. 
Households live for two consecutive time periods: childhood and adulthood.  Each child 
has one parent.  We assume a child will be of the same type as his/her parent (perfect 
inheritability of “industrious trait” from parent to children).  Consider a generation-𝑡𝑡 household.  
In the first period of his/her life (time 𝑡𝑡 − 1), as a child he/she does not work and earns no income.  
He/she consumes one unit of food which is paid for by his/her parent.  In the second period of 
his/her life (time 𝑡𝑡), as an adult he/she is endowed with one unit of time, which is allocated over 
leisure and market work.  He/she then spends the market wage income on manufacturing goods 
and child-rearing food.  For simplicity, we assume that adults have no demand for food.20 
The preference of a type-𝑖𝑖, generation-𝑡𝑡 household is defined over his/her consumption of 
manufacturing goods 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 , leisure 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  and number of children 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  in his/her adulthood (His/her 
childhood utility is normalized to zero).  It is represented by the utility function: 
(1)  𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = �𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�1−𝜎𝜎1−𝜎𝜎 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 log 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + γ log𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  ;  𝜎𝜎 ∈ (0,1), 𝜑𝜑2 > 𝜑𝜑1 ≥ 0, 𝛾𝛾 > 0 ; 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2. 
The two types of households differ in the utility weight 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖  they attach to leisure 
(“hardworkingness”): the more industrious individuals value less for leisure enjoyment, 
𝜑𝜑2 > 𝜑𝜑1 ≥ 0.  The utility function features the “hierarchy of needs” (Strulik and Weisdorf 2008; 
Vollrath 2009): the parameter restriction 𝜎𝜎 < 1 ensures that the elasticity of marginal utility with 
respect to manufacturing goods is smaller than that with respect to number of children. 21  
Intuitively, with such restriction, marginal utility from consuming more manufacturing goods 
diminishes at a slower rate than the marginal utility from having more children does.  So when 
they become wealthier, households will spend higher fractions of income on manufacturing 
goods. 22  On the other hand, the parameter restriction 𝜎𝜎 > 0 ensures diminishing marginal 
utility from manufacturing goods consumption.   
 Continuing the choice problem for the type-𝑖𝑖, generation-𝑡𝑡 household, in childhood he/she 
makes no choice, but just eats and survives.  In adulthood he/she faces a budget constraint.  If 
the household supplies an amount of (1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) working hours to the market, he/she earns a wage 
income of �1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡, where 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 is the wage per working hour at time 𝑡𝑡.  The wage income is 
then divided between purchasing manufacturing goods and child-rearing food.  Make the price of 
manufacturing goods the numéraire for all time periods, and let 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 be the price of food relative to 
20 We might also think of this as children storing some of their food for adulthood.  Letting adults 
demand food would not change the qualitative results. 
21 From (1), marginal utility with respect to manufacturing goods 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  equals �𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�
−𝜎𝜎
. 
Elasticity of marginal utility with respect to manufacturing goods equals � 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖�
−𝜎𝜎 ∙
𝜕𝜕�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖�
−𝜎𝜎
𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 � = 𝜎𝜎 <1. 
Similarly, elasticity of marginal utility with respect to number of children equals 1. 
22 Using later equations/results (2) and (4), for a type-𝑖𝑖, generation-𝑡𝑡 household, fraction of 
income spent on food equals 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖+𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝜎𝜎
𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖+𝛾𝛾�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖�
𝜎𝜎 = 𝛾𝛾
�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖�
1−𝜎𝜎
+𝛾𝛾
, which is decreasing in 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  if and 
only if 𝜎𝜎 < 1.  Therefore we restrict 𝜎𝜎 < 1 in (1) to match Engel’s law (on individual level), 
which states that a household would spend a lesser fraction of income on food as his/her income 
rises.  Note that we have used a result that manufacturing goods consumption increases with 
income.  See Appendix 3 mechanism 1 for the proof. 
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manufacturing goods at time 𝑡𝑡 .  Hence 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  and 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  are the expenditure spent on 
manufacturing goods and child-rearing food at time 𝑡𝑡  respectively.  Formally, the budget 
constraint facing the type-𝑖𝑖, generation-𝑡𝑡 household in his/her adulthood is: 
(2)  𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = �1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 ; 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2. 
 This type-𝑖𝑖, generation-𝑡𝑡 household maximizes the utility function (1) subject to the budget 
constraint (2).  This is a concave programming problem subject to a convex budget set and an 
interior solution is guaranteed.  His/her optimal decisions concerning the amount of 
manufacturing goods to consume 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 , leisure 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  and number of births 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  are related by the 
following two equations: 
(3)  𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡  ; 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2 ; 
(4)  𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  ; 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2. 
In equilibrium, the more industrious individuals will supply more hours to market work and earn 
higher wage incomes than the less industrious ones.  Since manufacturing goods and children are 
both normal goods, the more industrious individuals will consume more manufacturing goods and 
give more births too.  These are summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: (Household maximization) For 𝝈𝝈 > 0 , 𝝋𝝋𝟐𝟐 > 𝝋𝝋𝟏𝟏 ≥ 𝟎𝟎 , 𝜸𝜸 > 0  => 
𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕
𝟏𝟏 > 𝒎𝒎𝒕𝒕𝟐𝟐, 𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝟏𝟏 > 𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝟐𝟐, and 𝒍𝒍𝒕𝒕𝟏𝟏 < 𝒍𝒍𝒕𝒕𝟐𝟐 for all 𝒕𝒕. 
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
Note from (3) and (4) that both types of households will reduce their leisure enjoyment when 
market wage rises.  Also, they both give less birth when relative food price increases. 
 
4.2 Demographic dynamics and Industrious Selection 
Adult populations of the two types of individuals evolve according to: 
(5)  𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+11 = 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡1𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1 ; and 
(6)  𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+12 = 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡2𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2 , 
where the initial adult populations of the two types of individuals, 𝐿𝐿11  and 𝐿𝐿12 , are taken as given.  
The total adult population and the gross population growth rate are defined as: 
(7)  𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1 + 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2 ; and 
(8)  1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ≡ 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡+1𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡  . 
Note that 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 represents the number of children in the economy at time 𝑡𝑡. 
 The aggregate working hours supplied by households, 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡, are the sum of working hours 
supplied by the two types of individuals: 
(9)  𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡1)𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1 + (1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡2)𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2 . 
 The average leisure and average fertility rate are the population-weighted averages of their 
counterparts from the two types of individuals: 
(10)  𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡1+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡2𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡  ; 
(11)  𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡1+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡2𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡  . 
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The above two equations, together with proposition 1, imply that, ceteris paribus, when the 
proportion of the more industrious individuals (type 1) in population rises, average leisure 
decreases and average fertility rate increases.   
 From proposition 1 and population evolution equations (5)-(7), we have the following 
corollary: 
Corollary 1: (Industrious Selection)  The more industrious individuals (type 1) have 
an evolutionary advantage in terms of population composition, that is, 𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕
𝟏𝟏
𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕
 is increasing over 
time. 
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
Corollary 1 states our important result of Industrious Selection: when individual preferences are 
characterized by the “hierarchy of needs” utility function (1) with 𝜎𝜎 > 0, through labor-leisure 
optimization the more industrious individuals will earn higher incomes; through income effect on 
number of births and perfect inheritability of “industrious trait”, the more industrious individuals 
will possess an evolutionary advantage and gradually dominate the population composition.23  
Our theory yields a similar prediction as Darwin’s (1958, 120), who stated that, “favourable 
variations would tend to be preserved, and unfavourable ones to be destroyed” in the struggle for 
life.  Here, Industrious Selection destines that a certain variation of the human species (the more 
industrious individuals) to survive in the long run. 24   However, it is humans’ conscious 
maximization activity, instead of “struggle for existence in relation to other organic beings or to 
external conditions” (Darwin 1876[1872], 69), that underlies natural selection in our model.  The 
fittest of the human species is defined by fecundity, the ability to consciously raise the largest 
number of offspring.  This opens up an additional channel of evolution in human society when 
compared to the animal kingdom.25 26 
23 The prediction from Corollary 1 contrasts with Galor and Moav (2002).  In their paper, 
population heterogeneity originates from individuals possessing different preference on child 
quality versus child quantity – “high quality” type attaches a higher utility weight to child quality 
than “high quantity” type does.  Galor and Moav (2002) showed that, the “high quality” type has 
an evolutionary advantage over the “high quantity” type during the Malthusian era, and such an 
advantage is reversed after the Malthusian pressure relaxes.  Their model predicts that the “high 
quantity” type will dominate the population composition in the long run.  In contrast, in our 
model, the more industrious individuals always have an evolutionary advantage over the less 
industrious ones, and they will dominate the population composition in the long run. 
24 Clark (2007, 166) stated the emergence of “Modern Man” during the long Malthusian era:  
“Work hours rose … societies [became] increasingly middle class in their orientation.  
Thrift, prudence, negotiation, and hard work were becoming values for communities that 
previously had been spendthrift, impulsive, violent, and leisure loving”. 
In our theory, the “Modern Man” will be more industrious (hardworking and cooperative) than the 
primitive man. 
25 See Herbert Spencer’s quote ahead of the Introduction.  Relatedly, Becker (1991[1981], 
136-137) stated that Darwin’s theory loses relevance in human society if we do not take into 
account parents’ conscious investment to increase representation of their children in the next 
generation.  In Galor and Moav (2002), households consciously maximize their utility subject to 
a survival (subsistence consumption) constraint, which generates evolutionary pressure against 
individuals owing child quantity-biased preferences in the Malthusian era. 
26 We are aware of the potential conscious states in non-human animals (Boly et al. 2013).  
However, even this is the case, the channel through which conscious maximization activity 
generates evolutionary advantage through income effect on number of births is unique and 
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 4.3 Production 
There are two sectors producing final output in the economy: the agricultural (food) and 
manufacturing sectors.  Labor hours are the sole input in the two sectors.  Agricultural 
production is characterized by stronger diminishing returns to labor hours.  Learning-by-doing is 
the sole engine of technological progress in the two sectors (Arrow 1962; Matsuyama 1992).27 
4.3.1 The Agricultural sector 
Agricultural output at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴, is given by: 
(12)  𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼 ; 𝜇𝜇 > 0, 𝜀𝜀 ∈ (0,1), 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0,1) , 
where 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 is labor hours employed by the agricultural sector at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 > 0 and 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 > 0 are 
the levels of agricultural efficiency and technology at time 𝑡𝑡, both of which are determined 
endogenously.  The assumption 𝛼𝛼  ∈ (0,1)  assures that agricultural production displays 
diminishing returns to labor hours. 
 Technological progress in the agricultural sector arises from learning-by-doing externality: 
(13)  𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼, where 𝐴𝐴1 is taken as given. 
Here, we assume that the agricultural technological progress has a simple one-to-one relationship 
with the level of agricultural output.  The parameter restriction 𝜀𝜀 ∈ (0,1) entails diminishing 
returns to learning-by-doing in the agricultural sector.  Similar to Kremer (1993a), our 
learning-by-doing formulation implies that, ceteris paribus, technology growth rate rises with labor 
input (section 2); however, in our model technology progresses less than proportionately with 
labor input.  This shows one of the channels through which population affects production and 
growth through a scale effect in our model.28 29 
 Inspired by Kremer (1993b)’s work on the O-ring production theory (section 2), we 
hypothesize that the efficiency term 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 takes the O-ring production form: 
(14)  𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 = �∏ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗=1 � 1𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ; 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 ∈ (0,1] . 
where 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 is the total adult population at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 is a measure of how well an individual 𝑗𝑗 is 
at solving coordination problems during production process (“cooperativeness”).30  The more 
significant to humans. 
27 As our focus is to explain the onset of the Five Revolutions and Two Divergences over the AD 
years rather than to explain growth today, we overpass R&D, and indeed focus on 
learning-by-doing as the sole engine of technological progress in this paper.  R&D is an 
important ingredient to the study of modern economic growth.  See Acemoglu (2009) and Aghion 
and Howitt (2009) for textbook treatments. 
28 Kremer (1993a, 690) and Jones (1995, 520) hypothesized that aggregate technological progress 
takes the form of ?̇?𝐴 = 𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴𝜙𝜙𝑝𝑝ψ, where 𝐴𝐴 is the technology level, 𝑝𝑝 is the population level (or 
R&D labors in Jones paper), 𝑔𝑔 is the research productivity, 𝜙𝜙 and ψ are parameters.  In case 
of 0 < 𝜙𝜙 < 1, ψ > 0, the formulation implies population scale effect on technological progress 
in the short run, but not in the long run.  Our model differs from theirs by differentiating between 
different sectoral technological progresses and distinguishing efficiency and technology terms. 
29 In this paper, when we speak of population size having a “scale effect” on production and 
growth, we are referring to the population scale effect in the short run, but not in the long run when 
balanced growth path is attained (proposition 2). 
30 In Kremer (1993b, 571)’s original article, he hypothesized that the output rather than efficiency 
takes the O-ring production form: 𝑌𝑌 = (∏ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 )ψ, where 𝑌𝑌 is output, 𝑛𝑛 is the number of tasks 
(or workers), 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 is the skill of each worker, ψ is a parameter between 0 and 
1
𝑛𝑛
.  The crucial 
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industrious individuals are more cooperative and we assume 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 to take the form of: 
(15)  𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 = � 1, if person 𝑗𝑗 is a type 1 (more industrious) individual𝑣𝑣 < 1, if person 𝑗𝑗 is a type 2 (less industrious) individual  . 
Hence (14) can be simplified as 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 = (1)𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡(𝑣𝑣)𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = (𝑣𝑣)𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 .  The higher the proportion of the 
more industrious individuals is, the more efficient the economy is in bringing its agricultural 
output towards its potential production level.  To appreciate this, we consider two simple 
numerical illustrations.  First, suppose each less industrious individual is half as skillful as the 
more industrious individual at solving coordination problems (𝑣𝑣 = 0.5).  If, at time 𝑡𝑡, the 
population consists of only the more industrious type of individuals, the efficiency of the economy 
is (1)1 ∙ (0.5)0 = 1 and hence the agricultural production reaches its potential level: 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 =
𝜇𝜇(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼.  On the other hand, if half of the population is made up of the less industrious 
individuals, the efficiency of the economy falls to (1)0.5 ∙ (0.5)0.5 ≈ 0.71 and the agricultural 
production can only reach 0.71 of its potential level in this case.  Obviously efficiency increases 
monotonically with the proportion of the more industrious individuals in the economy.  This is 
how population affects production and growth through a composition effect in our model. 
 We adopt Weil (2013, 289)’s terminology that productivity is the multiple of efficiency and 
technology.  We denote the term 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀 as agricultural productivity at time 𝑡𝑡.  Hence the 
growth rate of agricultural productivity at time 𝑡𝑡 is: 
(16)  𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 ≡
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1)𝜀𝜀−𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀 = 𝑣𝑣(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+12𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1−𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) �𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 �𝜀𝜀 − 1 . 
Agricultural productivity rises as agricultural technological progress occurs and as the proportion 
of the less industrious individuals in population diminishes. 
 
4.3.2 The Manufacturing sector 
We adopt similar production and technological progress formulations in the manufacturing 
sector.  Manufacturing output at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀, is given by: 
(17)  𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 = 𝛿𝛿𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀)λ ; 𝛿𝛿 > 0, 𝜙𝜙 ∈ (0,1), λ ∈ (𝛼𝛼, 1] , 
where 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 is the labor hours employed by the manufacturing sector at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 are 
the endogenously determined manufacturing efficiency and technology at time 𝑡𝑡 .  The 
assumption λ ∈ (𝛼𝛼, 1] implies that manufacturing production also displays diminishing returns 
to labor hours, but to a lesser degree than agricultural production.  For simplicity, we have 
assumed efficiency in the manufacturing sector to take the same form 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡  as it does in the 
agricultural sector (14)-(15).  Hence we can interpret 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 as an economy-wide efficiency term.   
Technological progress in the manufacturing sector is again fueled by learning-by-doing 
externality: 
feature of this production form is that “the cross derivative of output in the skill of different 
workers is positive”.  In other words, there are strong complementarities among workers’ tasks.  
He employed the O-ring production function for output to explain income differences between rich 
and poor countries today (section 2).  Kremer (1993b) implicitly assumed that workers flow 
freely across countries so that assortative matching occurs.  In our model, workers stay in their 
own country throughout their lifetime, so that heterogeneity in workers’ quality exists within a 
country.  We think this fits well into the historical experience of most Eurasian countries. 
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(18)  𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 −𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 = 𝛿𝛿𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀)λ, where 𝑀𝑀1 is taken as given. 
There are diminishing returns to learning in the manufacturing sector (𝜙𝜙 < 1).   Similar to (13), 
labor hours employed by the manufacturing sector exerts a scale effect on the sector’s 
technological progress.   
The manufacturing productivity at time 𝑡𝑡 is defined as 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙, and the growth rate of 
manufacturing productivity at time 𝑡𝑡 is: 
(19)  𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀 ≡
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1)𝜙𝜙−𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙 = 𝑣𝑣(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+12𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1−𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) �𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 �𝜙𝜙 − 1 . 
Manufacturing productivity increases as manufacturing technological progress occurs and as the 
proportion of the less industrious individuals in population falls. 
 To recap: equations (13) and (18) show that population affects production and growth 
through two channels in our model: one is through the scale effect - a larger aggregate labor hours 
supply implies that either labor hours employed in the agricultural sector (𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴) or that in the 
manufacturing sector (𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀) increase.  This will intensify production and speed up productivity 
growth in at least one of the sectors.  The other channel is through the composition effect - a 
greater proportion of the more industrious individuals in population will alleviate coordination 
problems, and thereby improve production efficiency.  With learning-by-doing externality, it 
accelerates productivity growth in both sectors. 
 
4.3.3 The Aggregate final output 
The aggregate final output at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡, is given by the sum of values of agricultural output 
at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴, and of manufacturing output at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀: 
(20)  𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 . 
Note that the price of manufacturing output is the numéraire in the economy, and 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 is the relative 
food price at time 𝑡𝑡. 
 Per capita income at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, is given by: 
(21)  𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 . 
 Per capita income growth rate at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡
𝑦𝑦, is defined as: 
(22)  𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡
𝑦𝑦 ≡
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+1−𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡
 . 
 
4.4 Market clearing and wage equalization 
To close our model, we impose three conditions. 
4.4.1 Labor market clearing 
The first condition is labor market clearing.  At each time 𝑡𝑡, the total labor hours employed 
by the two production sectors equal the aggregate working hours supplied by households: 
(23)  𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 + 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 = 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 . 
 
4.4.2 Food market clearing 
The second condition is food market clearing. At each time 𝑡𝑡, the demand for food (for 
child-rearing purpose) equals the supply of food from the agricultural sector, meaning 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 =
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𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼.  We define 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 to be the fraction of the economy’s working hours devoted to 
agricultural production (agricultural labor hours share) at time 𝑡𝑡.  Manipulating the food market 
equilibrium condition gives: 
(24)  𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 ≡
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡
= 1
1−𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡
�
(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)1−𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀 �
1
𝛼𝛼 . 
Agricultural labor hours share increases with the population size, average fertility rate and average 
leisure; it decreases with the economy-wide efficiency term and agricultural technology level. 
 Similarly, we define 𝜒𝜒𝑡𝑡 to be the fraction of the economy’s working hours devoted to 
manufacturing production (manufacturing labor hours share) at time 𝑡𝑡.  By (23): 
(25)  𝜒𝜒𝑡𝑡 ≡
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡
= 1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 . 
Manufacturing labor hours share rises if labor hours are released from the agricultural sector. 
 
4.4.3 Wage equalization 
The third condition is wage equalization across the two production sectors.  We make two 
assumptions: first, labor hours are completely divisible and are freely mobile across sectors.  
Second, labor hours are paid according to the average product in the two sectors.31  At each time 
𝑡𝑡, wage equalization implies: 
(26)  𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 . 
The first equality in (26) gives the wage determination equation: 
(27)  𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 [𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀]1𝛼𝛼(𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼  . 
The second equality in (26) gives the food price determination equation: 
(28)  𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙𝜇𝜇(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀 ∙ (𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)1−𝛼𝛼(𝜒𝜒𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)1−λ . 
Note that by Walras’ law, when all other markets are in equilibrium, the manufacturing goods 
market will also attain its equilibrium: 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 = 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡1 + 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡2 . 
 
4.5 Equilibrium price and quantities 
The first period of our model is indexed with 𝑡𝑡 = 1, and the relevant initial conditions for the 
economy are given by {𝐿𝐿11 ,𝐿𝐿12 ,𝐴𝐴1,𝑀𝑀1}.  The equilibrium for the economy constitutes sequences 
of household allocation {𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡1,𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡2, 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡1, 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡2, 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡1, 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡2}𝑡𝑡=1∞ , production variables {𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 ,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 ,𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡}𝑡𝑡=1∞ , 
economy-wide efficiency and sectoral technologies {𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 ,𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1,𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1}𝑡𝑡=1∞ , population variables {𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+11 ,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+12 ,𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡, 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 , 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡}𝑡𝑡=1∞ , sectoral inputs {𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴,𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀}𝑡𝑡=1∞ , sectoral labor hours shares {𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡,𝜒𝜒𝑡𝑡}𝑡𝑡=1∞ , 
prices {𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡}𝑡𝑡=1∞ , and growth rates �𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 ,𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝,𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴,𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀�𝑡𝑡=1∞  which satisfy: 
(A) Household utility maximization: Given prices, �𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 , 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 , 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �  maximize household utility 
function (1) subject to budget constraint (2) for both types 𝑖𝑖 = {1,2} at time 𝑡𝑡. 
(B) Output production: Given efficiency, technology levels, labor hours input in each sector at 
31 This is a type of “share economy” (Drazen and Eckstei 1988, 437), where production incomes 
are divided among the working force. 
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time 𝑡𝑡, sectoral outputs {𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀} are obtained by the sectoral production functions (12) and 
(17).  The final output {𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡} is aggregated by (20), given prices.  Per capita income {𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡} is 
obtained from (21). 
(C) Market clearing conditions: (23) for labor hours; (24) for agricultural goods. 
(D) Wage equalization condition: Labor hours move across agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors until the average product of labor hours in the two sectors are equalized by (26). 
(E)  Sectoral labor hours shares definitions: (24) and (25). 
(F) Population evolution: Population size and composition {𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+11 ,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+12 }𝑡𝑡=1∞  evolve according 
to (7), (5), (6), while aggregate working hours, average leisure and average fertility rate {𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 , 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 , 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡}𝑡𝑡=1∞  evolve according to (9), (10), (11). 
(G) Economy-wide efficiency, agricultural and manufacturing technologies {𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡,𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1,𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1}𝑡𝑡=1∞  
evolve according to (14)-(15), (13), (18). 
(H) Growth rate definitions: (22) for per capita income growth rate, (8) for population growth 
rate, (16) and (19) for agricultural and manufacturing productivity growth rates. 
 The resulting system of equations from the above equilibrium conditions (A) to (H) is highly 
non-linear and is to be solved numerically.   
 
 
5 SIMULATION: DEVELOPMENT AND THE FIVE REVOLUTIONS 
 
5.1 Benchmark Simulation: Explaining the Five Revolutions 
In this section, we investigate the long-run development dynamics implied by the model.  In 
particular we explain how Britain transits from its Malthusian state, through the endogenous 
occurrence of the Five Revolutions, to the Modern Growth state.  We consider a model economy 
which starts in AD0 and ends in AD2500.  Each model period corresponds to 20 years, which is 
about the length of one generation.  Following history terminology, we denote “Ancient Period” 
as the period before AD450; “Medieval Period” as the period AD450-AD1500; “Modern Period” 
as the period after AD1500.32 
Table 2 shows the numerical values of benchmark parameters and initial conditions we use in 
this section.  We delay our discussion about parameter calibration to section 6.4.33  The key to 
bear for the time being is that parameters in Table 2 allow the model to simulate the onset of 
British Industrial Revolution and Demographic Revolution in AD1780 and AD1820 respectively.  
See Table 3.  For the occurrence of Industrial Revolution, our criterion is a model-simulated 
annual per capita income growth rate exceeding 0.29% (section 3.3).  For the occurrence of 
Demographic Revolution, our criterion is the onset of long-run decline in model-simulated average 
fertility rate (section 3.5). 
32 The Medieval Period began with the fall of Rome in AD476.  There have been various 
demarcations defining the start of the Modern Period: including the collapse of Byzantium in 
AD1453, the discovery of America by Christopher Columbus in AD1492, and the Renaissance. 
33 In section 6.4, we will calibrate an extended model with the Black Death, to match the timing of 
Industrial Revolutions and Demographic Revolutions in Britain, Continental Europe, China and 
Africa.  Then we will apply most of the calibrated parameters back to this section, with some 
minor adjustments. 
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INSERT TABLE 2, TABLE 3 HERE 
Figure 9 (solid lines) depicts the benchmark simulated development paths for (a) log of per 
capita income log𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡; (b) average fertility rate 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡; (c) growth rate of agricultural productivity 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴; 
(d) growth rate of manufacturing productivity 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀 ; (e) average working hours (1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡); (f) 
agricultural labor hours share 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡; (g) relative food price 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡; and (h) proportion of the more 
industrious individuals in population 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1/𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 .  Panels (a)-(c), (e)-(f) aim to display the Five 
Revolutions, while the others aid our explanation.  From panels (a) and (b), the per capital 
income and population growth paths are consistent with the three-stage development process 
highlighted by Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002).34  The economy was initially 
in the Malthusian era (AD0-AD1780), when per capita income was stagnating and population 
grew gradually.  Then the economy passed through the Post-Malthusian era (AD1780-AD1820), 
when per capita income growth and population growth accelerated.  From AD1820 onwards, the 
economy has entered the Modern Growth era, which is featured by sustainable per capita income 
growth and declining population growth rate. 
INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE 
Based on Figure 9 (solid lines), we give an account of the British development process.  
Throughout the Ancient Period to the early Modern Period (AD0-AD1600), the economy was in a 
stasis state where most of the economic and demographic variables stayed at constant levels.  
This was because of the low starting levels of population, agricultural and manufacturing 
productivities, and hence sectoral outputs were small and learning-by-doing was slow (panels 
(c)-(d)).  Population growth dissipated the slow overall productivity growth and so per capita 
income was confined at a low level (panel (a)).  During this epoch, production was concentrated 
in the agricultural sector to meet the food demand (panel (f)), promoting relatively faster 
technological progress in agriculture; however (gradual) population growth continuously raised 
food demand, and guarded against the relative food price drop (panel (g)).  The stability of the 
relative food price (relative cost of child-rearing) kept fertility and population growth rates at 
modest levels too (panel (b)).  Though, one thing that kept on changing during the long 
Malthusian era was the population composition.  By Corollary 1 Industrious Selection kept on 
relatively removing the less industrious individuals from the population (panel (h)), leading the 
way to the continuously increasing average working hours within this epoch (panel (e)).35 
During the late-Malthusian era (AD1600-AD1780), Britain witnessed the unfolding of the 
Agricultural Revolution.  Thanks to population growth, Industrious Selection and sectoral 
concentration in agriculture in earlier periods, the population size, the proportion of the more 
industrious individuals in population, as well as agricultural technology base had stockpiled to 
high enough levels.  Through learning-by-doing, agricultural technological progress speeded up 
(panel (c)), to break through stasis and cause a drop in relative food price (panel (g)).  This 
34 In the simulation, population growth rate follows qualitatively the same growth paths as 
average fertility rate, with the peak occurring in AD1820. 
35 Clark and Hamilton (2006) found that, during pre-industrial times, the richest testators left 
twice as many number of children as the poorest ones did in England.  Their result is consistent 
with our theoretical prediction that the richer ones (the more industrious individuals) would be the 
more fertile ones in the economy. 
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reduced the relative cost of child-rearing and raised fertility (panel (b)).  Since most of the 
agricultural productivity growth translated into increases in population growth rate, per capita 
income sat still at its low Malthusian level (panel (a)), complying with the “Iron Law of Wages” 
(Ricardo 1821).36  On the other hand, agricultural productivity was high enough to feed the 
population in this era, so Structural Transformation occurred (equation (24)) and labor hours 
shifted to the manufacturing sector (panel (f)).37  Yet manufacturing productivity growth was still 
slow (panel (d)). 
Next Britain came to the Post-Malthusian era (AD1780-AD1820), which started with its 
Industrial Revolution. To facilitate our explanation, we highlight four internal adjustment 
mechanisms in the model:38 
[Mechanism 1: Income effect]  Ceteris paribus, when wage increases, individual households 
will raise the number of births and manufacturing goods consumption, as well as the portion of 
income spent on the latter.  If this raises the relative aggregate demand for manufacturing goods, 
labor hours will shift from the agricultural sector (sector producing goods with higher elasticity of 
marginal utility) to the manufacturing sector (sector producing goods with lower elasticity of 
marginal utility).39 
[Mechanism 2: Relative price effect]  Ceteris paribus, if relative food price decreases, 
households will give more births.  Labor hours will shift from the manufacturing sector (sector 
with relative price increase) to the agricultural sector (sector with relative price decrease). 
[Mechanism 3: Technology growth effect]  Ceteris paribus, agricultural technological progress 
will shift labor hours towards the agricultural sector, while manufacturing technological progress 
will do the opposite. 
[Mechanism 4: Population growth effect]  Ceteris paribus, an increase in aggregate labor hours 
supply will shift labor hours from the agricultural sector (sector with stronger diminishing returns 
to labor hours) to the manufacturing sector (sector with weaker diminishing returns to labor 
hours). 
36 Ricardo (1821, 87-88) stated that the reproductive response of labor to real wage changes would 
in turn keep real wage at around the long-run natural level: 
“It is when the market price of labour exceeds its natural price, that the condition of the 
labourer is flourishing and happy, that he has it in his power to command a greater 
proportion of the necessaries and enjoyments of life, and therefore to rear a healthy and 
numerous family. When, however, by the encouragement which high wages give to the 
increase of population, the number of labourers is increased, wages again fall to their 
natural price, and indeed from a re-action sometimes fall below it.” 
37 The simulated agricultural labor hours share began its long-run decline in AD1660. 
38 See Appendix 2 for mathematical proofs of the four mechanisms.  Note that we disentangle 
relative price effect from relative marginal product effects (technology growth effect and 
population growth effect).  This distinguishes from Ngai and Pissarides (2007) and Ho (2016b)’s 
works.  See Ho (2016b) for more details on the relative price effect and relative marginal product 
effect. 
39 In our model, the direction of labor hours shift caused by the income effect is theoretically 
ambiguous.  To be more precise, with a heterogeneous population, although Engel’s law always 
holds on the individual level, it does not necessarily hold on the aggregate level.  This is a more 
general result than Kongsamut et al. (2001)’s model with a homogeneous population.  
Numerically, given our parameter values and initial conditions, the simulation result shows that the 
income effect always induces an agricultural-to-manufacturing structural transformation 
throughout the British development process.  See Appendix 2 Mechanism 2 for more details. 
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To summarize the four mechanisms, wage increase and relative food price drop will raise fertility.  
Wage increase, manufacturing productivity growth and aggregate labor hours (or population) 
growth will shift working hours to the manufacturing sector, while relative food price drop and 
agricultural productivity growth will do the opposite. 
 During the Post-Malthusian era, besides witnessing per capita income takeoff, Britain also 
experienced the Industrious Revolution, while the Agricultural Revolution and Structural 
Transformation were still underway.  Thanks to Structural Transformation, manufacturing 
technological progress took off (panel (d)) and slowed down the pace of relative food price decline 
(panel (g)).  Through a slower drop in the relative cost of child-rearing, rate of fertility increase 
decelerated (panel (b)).  Some improvement in aggregate productivity could then translate into an 
increase in per capita income rather than an increase in population, and Britain broke away from 
the Malthusian Trap (panel (a)), marking the Industrial Revolution.  Note that the real wage (not 
shown in Figure 9) also took off. 40  The wage improvement, together with manufacturing 
technological progress and population expansion, speeded up labor hours shift from the 
agricultural to the manufacturing sector [Mechanisms 1, 3, 4] (panel (f)), and Britain witnessed 
mass production of manufacturing goods.41  The wage takeoff also raised the opportunity cost of 
leisure, and both types of households responded by supplying more labor hours to the market, 
triggering the Industrious Revolution (panel (e)); households in effect shifted their consumption in 
the form of leisure to consumption in the form of market-supplied goods.42  Finally, through 
learning-by-doing, the aforementioned structural transformation and increase in aggregate labor 
hours supply further accelerated manufacturing technological progress, generating virtuous cycles 
of wage growth, structural transformation, labor hours supply increase and manufacturing 
productivity growth. 
 In AD1820, the Demographic Revolution set in and average fertility rate declined (panel (b)).  
Since then Britain has entered the Modern Growth era.  What triggered the Demographic 
Revolution was the “ultimate check to population” (Malthus 1826): rise in relative food price 
(panel (g)).  Since the late-Malthusian era, thanks to the labor hours shift towards manufacturing 
(panel (f)), learning-by-doing in the manufacturing sector had been relatively enhanced (panel (d)).  
The relatively mass production of manufacturing goods finally pushed up relative food price, 
reversing the heretofore relative price effect [Mechanism 2] and fertility trend in AD1820.43 
40 In our simulation, the real wages in terms of both food price and manufacturing goods price 
took off in around AD1780.  This result conforms to Crafts and Mills (2009)’s finding that 
English real wages were stationary until the end of the eighteenth century.  On the other hand, 
Møller and Sharp (2014) suggested that England might have escaped the Malthusian epoch in the 
mid-sixteenth century. 
41 The simulated relative food price was declining before AD1820, so the relative price effect, 
together with agricultural technology growth effect, exerted forces to push labor hours into the 
agricultural sector before AD1820 [Mechanisms 2, 3]. 
42 While being able to explain the Industrious Revolution since the eighteenth century, our model 
cannot replicate the large increase in working hours during AD1536-AD1578 as shown in Figure 4.  
The increase in working hours within this time frame was likely caused by the abolishment of 49 
holy days in England during AD1536, as a consequence of the Protestant Reformation (De Vries 
2008, 88).  The abolishment relaxed the maximum working days constraint and the households 
responded by supplying more labor hours to the market during the sixteenth century. 
43 Broadberry et al. (2015, 193-194) stated that, relative agricultural price rose strongly than ever 
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During the Modern Growth era (after AD1820), the continuous fertility decline added 
impetus to the aforementioned virtuous cycles.44  It further boosted per capita income and wage 
growth.  In terms of structural transformation, the relative price effect now pushed labor hours 
towards the manufacturing sector.  Also, the boosted wage further incentivized households to 
work more, become richer and spend increasing portions of their income on manufacturing goods.  
This further promoted production and learning-by-doing in the manufacturing sector.  The 
(enhanced) virtuous cycles allowed Britain to achieve sustainable per capita income growth in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
 However, the diminishing returns to learning-by-doing destined productivity growth to slow 
down in the Modern Growth era.  Since there exist a lower limit to agricultural labor hours share 
and an upper limit to working hours supplied per household, the productivity growth originating 
from structural transformation and increasing average working hours channels will eventually be 
exhausted.  Ultimately, the British economy will converge to a balanced growth path, which is 
characterized by proposition 2: 
Proposition 2: (Balanced growth path)  The balanced growth path (BGP) is defined as 
a steady state in the economy where the growth rates, sectoral labor hours shares and 
average working hours are constant, and population composition is dominated by type 1 
individuals.  Define the value of variable 𝒁𝒁 in BGP as (𝒁𝒁)∗ ≡ 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝒕𝒕→∞ 𝒁𝒁𝒕𝒕, and the growth 
rate of variable 𝒁𝒁 in BGP as (𝒈𝒈𝒁𝒁)∗ ≡ 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝒕𝒕→∞ 𝒁𝒁𝒕𝒕+𝟏𝟏−𝒁𝒁𝒕𝒕𝒁𝒁𝒕𝒕 .  Given 𝜶𝜶 + 𝜺𝜺 ≠ 𝟏𝟏, 𝝓𝝓 ≠ 𝟏𝟏, we have 
(a) (𝑬𝑬)∗ = 𝟏𝟏 . 
(b) (𝒈𝒈𝒁𝒁)∗ = 𝟎𝟎, 𝒁𝒁 = {𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒊, 𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒊, 𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊,𝒎𝒎, 𝒍𝒍,𝑳𝑳,𝑨𝑨,𝑴𝑴,𝒀𝒀𝑨𝑨,𝒀𝒀𝑴𝑴,𝒀𝒀,𝒚𝒚,𝜽𝜽,𝝌𝝌,𝒘𝒘,𝒑𝒑}, 𝒊𝒊 = {𝟏𝟏,𝟐𝟐} . 
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
In the balanced growth path, agricultural and manufacturing productions achieve their potential 
levels.  All individual and aggregate variables converge to constant values.45 
 
5.2 Industrious Selection as development accelerator 
 The importance of incorporating Industrious Selection in our model is two-fold.  First, it 
accelerates the development process.  Second, such an accelerator property offers an explanation 
to the historical divergence pattern in Eurasia.  We will investigate the second issue in section 6.  
For the first issue, we perform a counterfactual exercise to examine the accelerator property.   
Figure 9 (dashed lines) depicts the simulation result by adopting all parameters and initial 
conditions stated in Table 2, except re-setting 𝜑𝜑2 = 1.3.  When compared to the benchmark 
before in the early-nineteenth century.  The reasons were that food remained expensive while the 
price of manufactured goods fell dramatically due to mechanized production methods. 
44 After AD1820, the continuous fertility decline, that originated from the faster manufacturing 
technological progress, and agricultural-to-manufacturing labor hours shift maintained the rising 
trend of relative food price (panel (g)).  The relative food price rise in turn lowered average 
fertility [Mechanism 2]. 
45 Standing in the twenty-first century, we say “growth is sustainable” in the sense that there is 
still a long time before per capita income growth would decline to its zero balanced growth path 
level.  From Figure 9 panels (c) and (d), sectoral productivity growth would be still underway by 
AD2500, while in the balanced growth path these rates would converge to zero (proposition 2).  
Hence the model economy does not come close to the balanced growth path by AD2500. 
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economy (solid lines), the population in the counterfactual economy was more homogeneous in 
the sense that people were “hardworking-alike”.  Although the population as a whole was more 
hardworking, the counterfactual economy took off 400 years later than the benchmark economy 
did (AD2180 versus AD1780)!   
The key to the counterfactual economy’s later takeoff is that Industrious Selection was 
weakened when compared to the benchmark economy.  In both cases, economy-wide 
coordination problems were resolved gradually through evolutionary pressure across generations 
to relatively eliminate the less industrious type of individuals from the population.  However, in 
the counterfactual economy, such evolutionary pressure was weakened because the more 
industrious individuals had less comparative advantage in gaining composition supremacy during 
population evolution (panel (h)).  Hence the coordination problems became more persistent 
across generations, and cursed the counterfactual economy with a lagged development towards 
economic takeoff.  In case we set 𝜑𝜑2 = 1.01, where the Industrious Selection pressure was 
effectively removed, the economy did not take off before AD2500 (not shown in Figure 9).46 
Figure 9 also shows that, once the counterfactual economy took off, its per capita income 
grew at a faster rate than that previously enjoyed by the benchmark economy (panel (a)).  Hence 
our model has the implication that, whether the correlation between population heterogeneity and 
economic growth is positive depends on the stage of development (whether the economy has taken 
off from the Malthusian regime).  The reason why the counterfactual economy enjoyed a faster 
economic growth despite its greater population heterogeneity (panel (h)) in around AD2200 is that 
its population size had stockpiled to a high enough level to permit faster technological progresses 
in the two sectors (panels (c)-(d)); greater population heterogeneity by itself did not cause faster 
economic growth.47 
 One last point worth mentioning in our benchmark economy is that, a high proportion of the 
more industrious individuals in population and a high agricultural technology level are both 
pre-conditions for the Industrial Revolution to occur.  Only when we have sufficiently high 
efficiency and technology levels in the agricultural sector to produce enough food for the nation, 
can we release labor hours out of the agricultural to the manufacturing sector, and set stage for 
manufacturing technological progress that brings along the Industrial Revolution.  So what is 
crucial for a nation’s economic takeoff is not just its technology, but also its population.48 
 
 
46 See Appendix 3A for other sensitivity tests related to variation in parameters or initial values in 
the benchmark model. 
47 In contrast, Ashraf and Galor (2013) put forward that the low (genetic) diversity of native 
American populations and high diversity of African populations have been detrimental to 
development, while the intermediate levels of diversity of European and Asian populations have 
been conducive to development. 
48 North (1981, ch.12) argued that it was the better specified property rights, which increased 
market size and brought about a more efficient economic organization in Britain, that facilitated 
the British Industrial Revolution.  We agree that institution is also a necessary condition for the 
Industrial Revolution to occur; but it is not a sufficient condition as demonstrated by Netherlands, 
which also possessed a well-defined system of property rights, that its Industrial Revolution did 
not occur before the AD1860s (Mokyr 1999, 2000). 
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6 BLACK DEATH AND THE TWO DIVERGENCES 
 
In this section we investigate the causes of the wealth of nations.  From sections 6.1 to 6.5, 
we focus on exploring the divergence in economic performance among three nations/regions: 
Britain, Continental Europe and China throughout the history.  Denote Britain and Continental 
Europe as “the West” countries, and China as “the East” country.  We will argue, in section 6.1, 
that the Black Death in late-Medieval Europe was a key event in economic history that contributed 
to the East-West and within-Europe divergence in the Modern Period.  Sections 6.2 and 6.3 
further elaborate on this issue.  Sections 6.4 and 6.5 are for calibration and simulation.  In 
section 6.6 we add Africa into the picture.   
 
6.1 The questions and Black-Death-Origin hypothesis 
Borrowing Clark (2007, 1)’s opening paragraph in A Farewell to Alms: “The basic outline of 
world economic history is surprisingly simple.  Indeed it can be summarized in one diagram”: 
Figure 10.  It depicts the evolution of log of per capita GDP in Britain, Continental Europe, and 
China from AD1-AD2008 (we leave Africa for section 6.6). 
INSERT FIGURE 10 HERE 
Observing Figure 10, the questions pertaining to the Two Divergences in Eurasia include: 
[Question 1: Little Divergence within Europe]  Why was British income level above its 
Continental European competitors by AD1800? 
[Question 2: Little Divergence between the East and the West]  Why were Britain and 
Continental Europe’s incomes above China’s by AD1800? 
[Question 3: Timing of Industrial Revolution]  Why did the Industrial Revolution occur first in 
Britain, then in Continental Europe, and lastly in China? 
[Question 4: Great Divergence between the East and the West]  Why was there a large per 
capita income gap between the East and the West during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? 
[Question 5: British Relative Economic Decline]  Why was there a British relative economic 
decline in terms of per capita income growth rate when compared to Continental Europe during 
the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries? 
[Question 6: Chinese Growth Miracle]  Why is China’s economy catching up with the West at 
a fast rate today? 
 The particularly challenging question is [Question 3].  To put up the question more saliently, 
why did the Industrial Revolution take place first in Britain rather than in China (Needham 1969, 
Lin 1995)?  Throughout most of the history China had a larger population size than Britain and a 
comparable technology level.  Figure 11 depicts the relative population sizes and relative 
technology levels in Britain and China (as well as in Continental Europe and Africa) in AD0 and 
AD1500.49  Take AD0 Britain and AD0 China to make a comparison, AD0 China had 74.5 times 
49 Comin et al. (2010, 77) provided historical estimates of average overall technology adoption in 
Western Europe, China, Indian and Arab.  In constructing Figure 11, we assume Britain and 
Continental Europe shared the same level of technologies, and proxy African technology level to 
be the same as that in Arab in AD0 and AD1500.  On the other hand, we calculate the AD0 and 
AD1500 relative populations in the four nations/regions based on the AD1 and AD1500 population 
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more population and about 4% higher technology level than AD0 Britain, why did the Industrial 
Revolution first occur in the World’s Edge with such a tiny population at the outset?  Why Britain 
industrialized first was not coincidental.  Any theory aiming to explain the British Industrial 
Revolution should reconcile it from both the temporal and spatial perspectives.  For the temporal 
dimension, we have shown that the Industrial Revolution emerged as an endogenous event in the 
British development process in section 5.  For the spatial dimension, the British Industrial 
Revolution should be viewed as part of the inquiry into the causes of the Two Divergences. 
INSERT FIGURE 11 HERE 
 We put forward that the Black Death was the origin of Eurasian divergences.  In a nutshell, 
as depicted in Figure 12, the Black Death brought two developmental impacts to Britain (or 
Europe).  The first was promoting Industrious Selection by wiping out the less industrious 
population, raising average working hours, economy-wide efficiency and accelerating 
development (section 5.2).  The second was the depopulation that reduced production input, and 
through slower learning-by-doing it decelerated growth.  The dominance and long-run 
implication of the first impact explains Britain’s (or Europe’s) developmental lead over China in 
the post-Black Death era.  The more severe Black Death impact on Britain than in Continental 
Europe also accounts for Britain’s pre-industrial wealth supremacy and earlier industrialization.  
Eventually in the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries the population size factor dictated, 
explaining Britain’s relative decline and China’s growth miracle. 
INSERT FIGURE 12 HERE 
 
6.2 The Black Death – Historical Perspective 
The Black Death (AD1346-AD1353) has been one of the most severe epidemics outbreaks 
that have occurred in human history.  It ravaged Europe, North Africa, Asia Minor and the Middle 
East in the mid-fourteenth century.  In Europe, it was estimated that between 25% and 60% of the 
population were killed during the first few years of outbreak.50   
The outbreak of the Black Death has been considered by some historians as “a turning point 
in history” (Bowsky 1971).  It marked the time division between the High Middle Ages and the 
late-Medieval Period.  Although the Black Death brought along with it mourning pain and deaths 
in Europe, it also brought forward charming economic and social changes that prepare the 
European societies to move on to the Modern Period.  First, depopulation created labor scarcity 
and boosted workers’ wages, shifting the balance of power from employers to employees, and 
from landlords to peasants (Phelps Brown and Hopkins 1962; Penn and Dyer 1990; Roseberry 
1991, 25).  Second, the plagues accelerated the changes in consumption pattern: there were 
dietary improvements; households shifted their consumption from food to manufacturing goods 
(Dyer 1988; 1998, 174-175; Voigtländer and Voth 2013a).  Third, the increase in labor wages 
data from Table 1 in this paper. 
50 Gottfried (1983, xiii) stated that, “The Black Death … devastated the Western world from 1347 
to 1351, killing 25%-50% of Europe’s population and causing or accelerating marked political, 
economic, social, and cultural changes”.  Ziegler (1997[1969], 185) accepted that “a third of the 
population died of the Black Death”.  Benedictow (2004, 383) estimated an average death toll of 
60% in Europe between AD1346-AD1353.  Over a longer time horizon, Herlihy (1997, 17) stated 
that European population had been reduced by about two-thirds by the AD1420s. 
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encouraged innovations in labor-saving technologies, such as the replacement of grain farming by 
animal husbandry, and the adoption of water mills (Gottfried 1983, 138; Barbier 2011, 199).  
Other aspects such as culture, education, medical science, architecture, religion, art, and even 
marriage patterns were also influenced by the Black Death (Herlihy 1997, ch.3; Ziegler 
1997[1969], ch.16-17; Voigtländer and Voth 2013b).  As summarized by Benedictow (2004, 
393): 
“By creating a great deficit of labour [the Black Death] speeded up economic, technological, 
social and administrative modernization … It also hastened the breakdown of feudal 
economic structures and mentalities and the rise of a prevailing dynamic capitalist market 
economy and concomitant innovative and dynamic attitudes and mentalities.” 
 
Complementing Benedictow’s claim, we posit that, it was the Black Death that triggered a 
sweeping change in the overall population’s quality: “Survival of the Industrious” (hardworking 
and cooperative people).51  This in turn cultivated technological and economic development in 
Europe.  The Black Death is hence “a turning point in history” in the sense that it accelerated 
development process in the West relative to the East, resulting in the Western countries dominating 
the world in terms of their economic powers in the following few centuries. 
Our theoretical argument will rely on the assumption that the poor people were more 
vulnerable to the Black Death than the rich people did (section 6.3).  Benedictow (2004, 262, 266) 
stated two reasons why this was true: “Firstly, poor people lived in far more unhygienic 
environments … which increased their exposure to rat fleas; secondly, in pre-plague society, many 
poor and destitute people may have had their physiological resistance to disease (immunity) 
significantly impaired or weakened by long-term undernutrition or malnutrition”; data indicated 
that “the mortality among the poor and destitute was 5-6 percentage points higher than the 
mortality among the better-off social classes”.  Similarly, Herlihy (1997, 55-56) noted that 
medieval observers generally agreed that the poor were “much more susceptible” to plague 
inflection than the rich.  Some even claimed that "the Black Death of 1348 wiped out the poor 
completely.”52  Byrne (2012, 243, 288) also stated that: “Plague epidemics seemed to begin 
among the poor and to strike them the hardest … As the 14th century produced one more plague 
outbreak after another, authorities came to conclude a direct correlation between poverty and the 
disease.” 
 
6.3 Unified Growth Theory with Black Death Shock: Explaining the Two 
Divergences 
In this subsection, we incorporate the Black Death shock in our unified growth model 
(section 4) and explain how the Black Death gave rise to the Two Divergences in Eurasia.  We 
assume that the Black Death was more deadly to the poorer individuals than to the richer 
individuals (see section 6.2 for evidence).  In our model, from proposition 1, the less industrious 
51 See Charles Darwin’s quote ahead of the Introduction. 
52 The difference in mortality rates between the rich and the poor depends on how the rich and the 
poor were defined.  But their qualitative implications are the same: the poor were more 
susceptible to the Black Death than the rich. 
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(type 2) individuals would be the poorer group and so more susceptible to the Black Death. 
[Unified growth model with Black Death shock] 
 We model the Black Death as an exogenous decrease in population. 
 When the Black Death shock arrives, the population reduction starts within the type 2 
individuals group. 
 Only when 99% of type 2 individuals are exhausted, will there be loss of type 1 
individuals as a result of the plague. 
 
 Why was the Black Death the origin of the East-West divergence?  The outbreak of the 
Black Death (AD1346-AD1353), and possibly with the plague recurrences continuing into the 
mid-seventeenth century, brought two favorable effects to Britain and Continental Europe.53  The 
first was the direct impact on per capita income during the plague years.  Depopulation caused 
labor scarcity and pushed up wages, also the surviving population was more industrious as a whole 
and the average working hours increased.54  The rises in wages and working hours boosted per 
capita income in the West during the plague years.55 
The second favorable effect of the plagues was to expedite Industrious Selection during the 
plague years.  The plagues provided developmental impetuses by relatively eliminating the 
portion of population with traits unfavorable for economic growth (the less industrious individuals, 
who were less hardworking and cooperative), raising working hours, production efficiency and 
accelerating development.  This effect dominated the population scale effect on production and 
growth, so that Britain and Continental Europe enjoyed faster economic progress than China 
during the plague years (Figure 12).56 
 The second favorable effect also explains why Britain and Continental Europe could sustain 
higher per capita income levels than China even after the Black Death (and plague recurrences) 
faded away.  By the time the Black Death (and plague recurrences) reached an end, Britain and 
Continental Europe had acquired population compositions that were more conducive to production 
and growth.  Hence over the Modern Period the Little Divergence, Industrial Revolution and 
Great Divergence worked in Britain and Continental Europe’s favor over China.57 
53 In Britain and Continental Europe, the plagues have repeatedly returned: in AD1361-AD1362, 
the plague killed 10%-20% of people; from AD1369-AD1480 the plagues recurred every 5-12 
years, killing 5%-15% of the population; further outbreaks occurred in Britain in AD1499, 
AD1509-AD1510, AD1516-AD1517, AD1527-AD1530, AD1544-AD1546, AD1557-AD1559, 
AD1587-AD1588, AD1592-AD1593, AD1596-AD1598, AD1603-AD1604, AD1624-AD1626, 
AD1638-AD1639, AD1643-AD1644, AD1657-AD1659, AD1665-AD1666 (Gottfried 1983, ch.7; 
Slack 1985, 58). 
54 The rise in working hours is consistent with Hatcher (1994, 28)’s view that, “[i]t is far more 
likely that although labourers and smallholders were refusing to accept all the work they were 
offered they were on average spending more time, not less, in employment than their predecessors 
had been able to”.  Similarly, Epstein (2000, 57) stated that, “the Black Death reduced the 
proportion of un- or under-employed in the population and increased labour participation”. 
55 The wage increase together with “Survival of the Industrious” might also answer Clark (2007, 
181)’s question on why England had high working hours by AD1800 (section 2). 
56  Broadberry et al. (2015, Table 10.02) provided per capita GDP estimates in England, 
Netherlands, Italy, Spain and China in AD1400.  The former three countries had overtaken China 
by AD1400. 
57 China’s per capita GDP relative to Western Europe’s had been continuously declining from 
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 On the issue of within-Europe divergence prior to the late-nineteenth century, why did 
Britain have an edge over its Continental European competitors?  The Black Death is again the 
key.  Table 4 shows the population estimates of Britain (England and Wales) and other parts of 
Europe in AD1300 and AD1400.  Britain suffered more from the Black Death in terms of the 
depopulation percentage when compared to other parts of Europe.  There was a population loss of 1 − 3,000
5,750 ≈ 48%  in Britain compared to 1 − 64,95088,450 ≈ 27%  in other parts of Europe during 
AD1300-AD1400.  We assume the 27% death rate in other parts of Europe applied to Continental 
Europe being defined in this paper.  The more deadly plagues in Britain than in Continental 
Europe relatively accelerated Industrious Selection in the former.  By the same mechanism 
described in the previous paragraphs, this led Britain to enjoy a superior pre-industrial per capita 
income growth path and an earlier industrialization than Continental Europe. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
6.4 Calibration 
Next, we calibrate the unified growth model with Black Death shock.  Similar to section 5, 
we consider a model economy which starts in AD0 and ends in AD2500.  Each model period 
corresponds to 20 years.  Table 5 shows the numerical values of (baseline) parameters and initial 
conditions we use in this section. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 For the sectoral production functions, we follow Strulik and Weisdorf (2008) in setting 
𝜇𝜇 = 0.5, 𝛼𝛼 = 0.8, 𝜙𝜙 = 0.3, 𝜆𝜆 = 0.931.58  We let 𝜎𝜎 = 0.01 to approximate quasi-linear utility 
function.  Such a small  𝜎𝜎 value ensures that Industrious Selection progresses at a slow pace 
without demographic shocks (Corollary 1).59  Next, we set parameter values that allow the model 
to simulate the timings of Industrial Revolutions and Demographic Revolutions as listed in Table 
6.60  For Britain, we set 𝜑𝜑1 = 1.05, 𝜑𝜑2 = 1.65, 𝛾𝛾 = 4.95, 𝜀𝜀 = 0.456, 𝛿𝛿 = 2, 𝑣𝑣 = 0.3225, 
𝐴𝐴1 = 11.95  and 𝑀𝑀1 = 150 .   To fit into AD0 technology comparison in Figure 11, for 
Continental Europe, we set 𝐴𝐴1 and 𝑀𝑀1 to take the same values as those in Britain.  For China, 
we set 𝐴𝐴1 and 𝑀𝑀1 at 
1
0.96 times those in Britain.  To fit into AD0 population comparison, we 
set initial Chinese type 1 and type 2 population to be 0.003 and 0.007 respectively, and divide 
them by 74.5  and 3.35  respectively to obtain the British and Continental European AD0 
counterparts. 
77.5% in AD1500 to the all-time low 7.3% in AD1973, rebounding rapidly thereafter (Brandt et al. 
2014, Table 1). 
58 In Strulik and Weisdorf (2008)’s paper, they set 𝜆𝜆 = 0.95.  We adjust 𝜆𝜆 to a slightly smaller 
value in this paper for a purely technical reason: to guarantee Matlab to solve for real solution 
paths throughout the simulation periods. 
59 Note that when 𝜎𝜎 = 0, Industrious Selection will be shut down because the more industrious 
individuals will choose the same number of births as the less industrious ones. 
60 Our calibration relies on manually adjusting parameters in Table 5 to match the timing 
constraints in Table 6, rather than on micro-evidence from consumption/production data in specific 
(short) time periods.  Another constraint we face is that Matlab cannot always solve for real 
solution paths, given the complexity of the equilibrium equation system. 
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INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 We explain our timing choices in Table 6.  Maddison (2008) provided per capita income 
estimates in Western Europe on a yearly basis since AD1870, when sustainable growth occurred.  
We take AD1860 as the onset year of the Industrial Revolution in Continental Europe.  From 
Maddison (2008), China and Africa have undergone sustainable per capita income growth on 
yearly basis since AD1950 and AD1994 respectively.  We take AD1960 and AD2000 as the years 
of Industrial Revolutions in the two nations/regions respectively.  Chesnais (1992, 133) showed 
that fertility transition (birth rate dropping from 30 per 1,000 to 20 per 1,000) occurred in Sweden, 
Switzerland, Belgium, Demark, Norway, Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Finland within 
AD1880 to AD1920.  We take AD1900 as the year of Demographic Revolution in Continental 
Europe.  For China, we take AD1980 as the time of Chinese Demographic Revolution.61  For 
Africa, Maddison (2008) showed that African population growth rate stayed fairly stable within 
AD1990-AD2008, and it dropped in AD2009.  We simply presume AD2020 as the year when 
Africa will go through its Demographic Revolution. 
For calibrating the effects of the Black Death on European populations, we assume for 
simplicity that all such effects were concentrated in one model period: AD1340-AD1359.  We 
adjust the mortality rates for type 1 and type 2 individuals during AD1340-AD1359 in the model 
to match the aggregate death rates during the fourteenth century implied by Table 4.  In Britain, 
under our model simulation, in the period prior to the Black Death (AD1320-AD1339) there 
would be 52% of type 1 individuals and 48% of type 2 individuals within the population.  We set 
the Black Death to kill off 0.9% of type 1 individuals and 99% of type 2 individuals, to yield 1 − [0.52 × (1 − 0.009) + 0.48 × (1 − 0.99)] ≈ 48%  aggregate death rate during the model 
period AD1340-AD1359, to match what we computed in section 6.3.62  Similarly, in Continental 
Europe, by AD1340 the model simulates 53% of type 1 individuals and 47% of type 2 individuals 
within the population.  We set zero mortality rate for type 1 individuals and 57% mortality rate 
for type 2 individuals to yield 1 − [0.53 × (1 − 0) + 0.47 × (1 − 0.57)] ≈ 27%  aggregate 
death rate during the model period AD1340-AD1359, to match our computed value in section 6.3. 
We make a note for the calibration in section 5.1.  We did not have Black Death shock there.  
So in that section we adjust 𝜑𝜑1 = 1, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.02296 so that Britain would industrialize in AD1780, 
and British Demographic Revolution would occur in AD1820. 
 
6.5 Simulation: Eurasian Economic History 
We employ the calibrated model to simulate the divergences among Britain, Continental 
Europe and China in AD0-AD2500.  Figure 13 depicts the development paths for the same set of 
variables we considered in Figure 9; the solid lines are for Britain, while the dashed and dotted 
lines are for Continental Europe and China respectively.  In panel (a), we replicate the patterns 
61 The total fertility rate in China fell from 5.7 per woman in AD1970 to 2.8 per woman in 
AD1979.  By international standard China had by and large completed the fertility transition, in 
the absence of the one-child policy, by the late-AD1970s (Wang and Mason 2008, 138). 
62 We use the formula:  
Aggregate death rate = 1-� 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇1 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝. % × (1 − 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇1 𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇)+ 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇2 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝. % × (1 − 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇2 𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇)� . 
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pertaining to the Two Divergences we highlighted in [Question 1]-[Question 6] (or Figure 10) in 
section 6.1. 
INSERT FIGURE 13 HERE 
 We can understand basic Eurasian economic history from analyzing Figure 13 (and Figure 
14 to follow).  The population scale effect and the population composition effect will be crucial 
to explain the relative rise and fall of nations.  Prior to the Black Death, all the three 
nations/regions were stuck in low-income Malthusian Traps (panel (a)).  The slow technological 
progresses impeded significant advancements in per capita income.  In fact, thanks to its initial 
larger population size and more advanced technology levels, China had an advantage over Britain 
and Continental Europe in terms of production and technological progress prior to the Black Death, 
making it the wealthiest nation in most of the time prior to AD1340 (however, the differences in 
wealth prior to AD1340 are too small to be observed in Figure 13, panel (a)). 
 The outbreak of the Black Death during the mid-fourteenth century was the “turning point in 
history” when the West made significant economic progress relative to the East.  In addition to 
the current literature, we argue that it was the “Survival of the Industrious” (relative depopulation 
of the less industrious individuals) that led to the rise of Europe, especially Britain, in the early 
Modern Period.63  The immediate impact of the Black Death was raising wage and average 
working hours (panel (e)), leading to higher per capita incomes in Britain and Continental Europe 
(panel (a)).  Within AD1340-AD1800, Britain and Continental Europe also benefited from 
possessing higher proportions of the more industrious individuals in population (panel (h)), and 
therefore they enjoyed higher production efficiencies and faster technological progresses than 
China did (panel (c) and (d)).  Although the Iron Law of Wages was still operative in early 
Modern Europe, such faster technological progresses allowed Britain and Continental Europe to sit 
at the high-income Malthusian Traps when compared to China’s low-income one (panel (a)).  
Hence the Little Divergence between the East and the West emerged.  The above discussion 
answers [Question 2] in section 6.1. 
Next, for the British exceptionalism, the origin was the stronger Black Death impact on the 
British population composition than on Continental Europe’s, while there was no Black Death in 
China.  Such an order of impact relatively expedited Industrious Selection in Britain than in 
Continental Europe, in Continental Europe than in China.  Hence after the Black Death Britain 
possessed the highest proportion of industrious individuals in population among the three 
nations/regions.64  This gave Britain an upper hand in terms of production and growth, and it 
turned into the richest country during the Little Divergence era.   As observed from panels (a) to 
(f) in Figure 13, Britain underwent the Five Revolutions at earlier dates than Continental Europe 
63 Various hypotheses have been proposed to explain the Little Divergence, including institutional 
difference (North and Thomas 1973), geography (Diamond 1997), access to Atlantic trade 
(Acemoglu et al. 2005), advanced skill formation (Baten and van Zanden 2008), European 
Marriage Pattern (Voigtlander and Voth 2009, 2013b), disease spread through trade and war 
(Voigtlander and Voth 2009, 2013a, 2013c). 
64 Allen and Weisdorf (2011, Table 2) and Malanima (2011, Table A1.3) provided annual working 
days per person estimates in Britain and in Italy respectively.  Throughout AD1433-AD1800, 
Britain’s working days rose from 165 to 320-343; throughout AD1450-AD1800, Italy’s working 
days rose from 136 to 210.  British labor worked more days per year than Italian labor in the 
post-Black Death era. 
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and China did.  Britain industrialized in AD1780, breaking away from its Malthusian Trap and 
further exaggerating the within-Europe and Anglo-Chinese per capita income gaps in the 
early-nineteenth century.  These answer [Question 1] and [Question 3] in section 6.1. 
Following Britain, Continental Europe took off in AD1860.  In the century that follows, 
Britain and Continental Europe’s per capita income kept on growing while China was still 
stagnating, leading to the Great Divergence between the East and the West. 65   Since the 
late-nineteenth century, there has been a relative economic decline in Britain when compared to 
Continental Europe - per capita income grew faster in Continental Europe than in Britain (panel 
(a)).  This was because the scale effect on production and growth originating from the larger 
population size in Continental Europe dominated the population composition effect.  The above 
answers [Question 4] and [Question 5] in section 6.1.66 
 For China, in AD1960, the country finally accumulated enough agricultural and 
manufacturing technologies, as well as a sufficiently high proportion of the more industrious 
individuals in population that permitted its takeoff from the Malthusian regime.  Similar to 
Continental Europe’s case during the British relative economic decline, China has benefited from 
its large population size and has enjoyed fast per capita income growth since its takeoff, rapidly 
narrowing the Great Divergence gap between the East and the West.  This answers [Question 6] 
in section 6.1.67  Our model predicts that the fast per capita income growth in China today is 
sustainable, and China will overtake Britain and Continental Europe eventually.  The East will 
ultimately regain its economic supremacy over the West due to its larger production scale.68 
 
6.6 Adding Africa into the picture 
In this subsection, we add Africa into the picture of Eurasian economic history.  The main 
65 Before the emergence of the Great Divergence literature (Pomeranz 2000; Galor and Mountford 
2006, 2008), growth economists mainly focused on modeling mechanisms of modern economic 
growth (Solow 1956; Romer 1986; Lucas 1988; Romer 1990; Aghion and Howitt 1992; Jones 
1995), or on tracing growth determinants from empirical analysis (Barro 1991; Mankiw et al. 1992; 
Young 1995; Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001). 
66 See Broadberry and Crafts (2003) and Crafts (2012) for other explanations for the British 
relative economic decline.  The former stated that the inability to transfer labor out of the 
agricultural sector, poor at implementing mass production methods in British manufacturing, 
prevalence of principal-agent problems in British companies, and government’s overemphasis on 
maintaining employment levels hampered Britain’s productivity growth relative to the Continental 
European countries during AD1950-AD1979.  The latter argued that weak competition, 
inadequate management and dysfunctional industrial relations were responsible for the British 
relative decline from the AD1870s to AD1970s. 
67 Pomeranz (2000) offered a geographic explanation for the origin of the Great Divergence 
between the East and the West.  He stated that the British coal deposits and Europe’s access to 
overseas colonies were responsible for Britain and Europe’s head start in industrialization.  On 
the other hand, Brandt et al. (2014) attributed China’s relative economic decline in the nineteenth 
century to the political-economic system that protected the interests of the elites who resisted 
reforms and changes.  Only in the late-twentieth century were the institutional barriers 
obstructing prosperity and growth overcome and led to China’s current economic boom. 
68  Xu (2011) analyzed China’s contemporary spectacular growth performance through its 
institution - the regionally decentralized authoritarian (RDA) regime.  The RDA regime allied 
China’s central-local incentives towards economic growth through the personnel control system, 
and facilitated regional competition and reform experiments.  However the intrinsic deficiencies 
of the RDA regime (multi-task problems, law enforcement, firm independence) might place 
obstacles to China’s future development. 
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question we address is:  
[Question 7: African Stagnation]  Why is Africa still (nearly) stagnating today? 
From Figure 10, African economic growth has picked up since the late-twentieth century, but at a 
slower pace when compared to China’s.  Maddison (2008) provided the annual per capita GDP 
growth rates for 53 individual (or pairs of) African countries in AD1990-AD2008, and 18 of them 
were suffering from zero or even negative growth rates.  Most of these countries make up the 
bottom layer of the Great Divergence pattern (such as the Niger plot in Figure 8). 
 To answer [Question 7] using our unified growth model, we redo the simulation exercise 
using all the calibrated parameters from Table 5, while changing the initial conditions on 
population and technologies based on Figure 11 (See Table 7). 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
Figure 14 depicts the simulated African development paths (dotted-dashed lines) when 
compared to China’s (dotted line). 69  From panel (a) African per capita income has been 
stagnating since AD0.  Such stagnation came to an end at the turn of the twenty-first century.   
INSERT FIGURE 14 HERE 
Since Africa and China had similar technology levels in AD0 and similar population 
composition evolution paths (panel (b)), the divergence in per capita income growth paths between 
Africa and China must have come from the long-run accumulated scale effect originating from the 
difference in AD0 population sizes.  Such a cumulative scale effect over two thousand years since 
AD0 resulted in the African economy taking off nearly half a century later than China’s did.  
Africa is crossing the borderline between Malthusian and Post-Malthusian regime today, and it 
will go through its Demographic Revolution in the near future (AD2020). 
Combining the per capita income panels from Figures 13 and 14, we obtain the evolution 
pattern of the North (Britain, Continental Europe) – South (China, Africa) income difference 
depicted in Figure 8 or 10.  This completes our understanding on basic Eurasian economic 
history. 
 
 
7 DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 Historical shocks and Development/Divergence 
The central theme of this paper is the construction of a unified growth theory with 
Industrious Selection to reconcile the stages of development (Five Revolutions), patterns of 
East-West divergence (pre-Industrial Little Divergence, Great Divergence and Chinese Growth 
Miracle), North-South divergence (African Stagnation) and within-Europe divergence 
(pre-Industrial Little Divergence, British Industrial Revolution and British Relative Economic 
Decline).  Given the initial population and technology conditions in AD0, with one observable 
exogenous shock (the Black Death), our theory endogenously reconciles development and 
divergence among Eurasian nations/regions in the next two millennia (AD0-AD2000). 
69 The dotted lines depicting China in Figure 14 are exactly the same as the dotted lines depicting 
China in Figure 13. 
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We agree with Broadberry (2015) and Temin (2016) that the Black Death and discovery of 
new trade routes are key (demographic- and geographic-) shocks in economic history.  Historical 
shocks are perhaps the first important elements in explaining issues relating to long-run 
development and divergence.  To make a comparison, most socio-political-economic structures 
are endogenous (just think of the number of sociologists, political scientists and economists 
explaining structural phenomena in their fields).  Attributing cross-country divergences to 
socio-political-economic structures begs the question on why socio-political-economic structures 
differed across nations at the outset, and motivates us to trace for even earlier shocks for 
explanation. 70  In this paper, we focus on the Black Death shock and let all other things 
endogenously determined in our theory.  Note that we are not saying that 
socio-political-economic structures are not important, as they will shape the impact of historical 
shocks.  The bottom-line is that we should take shocks and structures together in explaining 
economic history.  For example, we relate the Black Death shock with economic structures 
(overall preference evolution and coordination problems) through a biological channel (Industrious 
Selection) to reconcile Eurasian economic history.71 
Historical shocks and the fostered structures are inseparable components that explain current 
development and divergence.  This applies not only to the economic front, but also to the 
demographic front.  For example, in Figure 13 panel (h), even though the populations in the three 
nations/regions started with the same overall preference in AD0, the Black Death shock and 
long-run economic development had made them diverge by AD2000.  This poses a challenge to 
the fundamental assumption of identical aggregate preference across nations, which is often used 
in economic models, in accounting for international income/demographic differences today (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin 1992; Manuelli and Seshadri 2009).72 
 
7.2 Human trait evolution and Economic development 
Our theory argues for the importance of Industrious Selection in rendering evolutionary 
advantage to the relatively industrious population in development process (Corollary 1).  More 
generally, our theory relies on the income effect on number of births to confer an evolutionary 
advantage on a certain portion of the population, whose intrinsic trait will determine overall 
preference or technology evolution in the economy in the long run.  This type of mechanism may 
70 For example, Kremer (1993a, 709) mentioned the “melting of the polar ice caps at the end of 
the ice age, around 10,000 B.C., and the consequent flooding of land bridges” as another 
geographic shock event that shaped technological development in the Old World, Americas, 
mainland Australia, Tasmania, and Flinders Island before AD1500. 
71 Borrowing Morris (2010, 557)’s words:  
“The West rules because of geography.  Biology tells us why humans push social 
development upward; sociology tells us how they do this (except when they don't); and 
geography tells us why the West, rather than some other region, has for the last two hundred 
years dominated the globe.  Biology and sociology provide universal laws, applying to all 
humans in all times and places; geography explains differences.” 
72 Related to our argument, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) found that historical transatlantic and 
Indian Ocean slave trades reduce trust within African societies today.  Galor and Özak (2015) 
noted that historical return to agricultural investment affects a country’s rate of time preference 
today.  Becker et al. (2015) found that the length of time elapsed since two populations shared 
common ancestors predicts how similar two countries’ risk preferences are today. 
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shed light on constructing new theories to explain the long-run declines in interest rate, violence 
and the rise of literacy throughout human history (Clark 2007, ch.9).  As most economic and 
demographic variables were static over the long Malthusian era, it is hard not to suspect human 
trait evolution to be the main cause driving all those long-run rising and declining trends. 
Within a country we have shown that Industrious Selection accelerates development (section 
5.2).  The crucial assumption to achieve this result is that the more industrious population, who 
enjoys an evolutionary advantage, also inherits traits which are more conducive to economic 
growth.  In this paper we modeled “hardworkingness” and “cooperativeness” as one pair of such 
traits.  This is not the only trait pair that is conducive to economic growth.  For example, we 
may model the more hardworking individuals to be better entrepreneurship innovators 
(Schumpeter 1934), more willing to embark on education and training (Mincer 1958), more 
capable to deal with disequilibria associated with economic growth (Schultz 1975), better at 
redesigning institutions that solve coordination failures and facilitate market integration (Epstein 
2000, ch.1), more likely to learn and adopt new innovations (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009), and so 
forth.  These can also generate the accelerator property. 
What our theory emphasizes is the “supply side” of human trait evolution; the “demand side” 
may be just as significant.  Due to geographic or political reasons, some traits might be rewarded, 
incentivizing people to preserve them.  From a historical perspective, one trait that might have 
been important to development during the Modern Period was shipbuilding trait.  Take Portugal 
and China in the fifteenth century as examples.  For Portugal, there was a “strategic benefit in 
being located on the South Atlantic coast of Europe near to the exit of the Mediterranean” 
(Maddison 2001, 57).  The demand for Portuguese deep-sea fishing and African slavery trade 
might have incentivized people there to reward shipbuilding trait.  Conversely, although China 
was leading the Europeans in terms of shipbuilding techniques by the early-fifteenth century, Ming 
dynasty’s “increasing concern to defend the new northern capital [Beijing] against potential 
invasion form Mongolia or Manchuria” led it to abandon the ocean diplomacy; fleets and 
sea-going junks were reduced or prohibited (Maddison 2007, 163).  It is no surprise under these 
circumstances that the shipbuilding trait hardly got an evolutionary advantage in China than in 
Portugal, or more generally, in the Atlantic European nations.73  This might explain why Atlantic 
European nations dominated the oceans in the age of imperialism, despite their inferior 
shipbuilding technology at the outset.74 
 Across country we have shown how the Black Death gave rise to the European 
exceptionalism by speeding up Industrious Selection.  In comparison Africa has been stagnating 
partly because the slow evolutionary nature of population composition has maintained the 
73 In the late-fifteenth century, the Chinese emperor ordered to retrieve the documents concerning 
Zheng He’s treasure voyages (AD1405-AD1433) from the War Office.  However, the officer 
extracted the documents, and burned them, describing the contents as “deceitful exaggerations of 
bizarre things far removed from the testimony of people's ears and eyes” (Duyvendak 1939, 
395-396). 
74 For example, Maddison (2001, 76, 92) also mentioned that the Netherlands has “occupied a flat 
amphibious terrain where the relationship between land and water was very close”, and that in 
Britain “the strategic advantages of being an island were intelligently exploited. The British 
merchant fleet was greatly expanded”. 
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economy-wide coordination problems across generations (section 6).  This provides an 
explanation in additional to the institutional arguments (North and Thomas 1973; Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2012) for why some countries failed to take advantage of trade and investment to 
promote their economic growth.  Even when there are no institutional barriers to trade and 
investment, slow population evolution can contribute to the persistence of large income gaps 
between rich and poor countries. 
The development policy implication from our theory is straightforward: to promote the shift 
of population structure to one that is more conducive to growth.  Although decimating the less 
conducive population can theoretically do the job, genocide policy is immoral and objectionable.  
Rather, we can promote Industrious Selection by raising fertility of the more industrious 
individuals, or doing the opposite for the less industrious ones.75 76  Alternatively, we can trace 
out and relieve the underlying causes of coordination problems within the society, thereby 
improving production efficiency of the economy.  Lastly, brain-draining industrious individuals 
from abroad is also an option in an open-economy setting.77 
 
7.3 Sensitivity test 
One sensitivity test we wish to highlight is the robustness of our results to the variation in 
pre-Black Death population estimates in Britain (Table 4).  There has been a wide range of such 
estimates in the literature.  Table 8 shows some of them. 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
Applying our calibrated model from section 6, Broadberry et al. (2011), Campbell (1991) and 
Clark (2007)’s population estimates give us the same qualitative results as shown in Figure 13.  
However, using Russell (1966)’s population estimate, the model predicts counterfactually that 
Britain would industrialize later than Continental Europe.  This is because Russell (1966)’s 
estimate implies Continental Europe suffered from a higher aggregate death rate than Britain in the 
fourteenth century, which in turn implies that Industrious Selection would work in Continental 
Europe’s rather than in Britain’s favor.78 
 What is required for our Industrious Selection model to reconcile the Little Divergence 
within Europe is a higher Black Death rate in Britain than in Continental Europe.  One caveat in 
Table 4 is that Continental Europe might have suffered from a higher Black Death toll rate but its 
population recovered at a faster pace than Britain.  The latter might be caused by the emergence 
75 For example, observing from Figure 14, Africa could never overtake China in terms of per 
capita income.  However, if we allow Africa to adopt an “evolution policy” such that the 
reproductive preference of the more industrious individuals was to be exogenously raised by 10% 
starting from AD2000, then Africa could catch up with China by AD2200.  Equivalently, we can 
exogenously hamper population growth of the less industrious individuals, say, to reduce by 10% 
their reproductive preference starting from AD2000.  This can achieve qualitatively the same 
result.  See Appendix 3B for more details. 
76 In reality, conditional transfers based on industrious behavior might be considered.  For 
example, Progresa, a Mexican poverty program in AD1998-AD2000, promised educational grants 
to eligible poor mothers with children who attended 85% of school days (Schultz 2004). 
77 See Gibson and McKenzie (2011) and Docquier and Rapoport (2012) for surveys on Brain 
Drain. 
78 See Appendix 3C for sensitivity tests pertaining to variation in values of population estimates in 
Britain and Continental Europe during the Black Death era. 
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of the European Marriage Pattern (EMP) (Hajnal 1965), which kept total fertility rate low, in 
Britain relative to in Continental Europe.79  If this is the case, then Industrious Selection would 
work in favor of Continental Europe. 
On the other hand, in sections 6.4-6.5 we treated Continental Europe as one unified economic 
unit throughout the analysis.  By doing so we implicitly assigned a greater population scale effect 
advantage on growth to Continental Europe than to Britain.  In reality, Continental Europe has 
been a region characterized by its high political fragmentation since the fall of the Western Roman 
Empire in AD476.  No single European nation could restore the large scale of unification that the 
Roman Empire once did.  If we take this fact into account, our theory would predict even a 
greater within-Europe Little Divergence prior to AD1800 and later industrialization dates for the 
Continental European nations.  A similar argument holds for Africa in section 6.6. 
 
7.4 Demographic-economic paradox 
Our theory also provides an explanation for the demographic-economic paradox.  The 
paradox states that the positive correlation between income and fertility within a nation (measured 
on individual level) turns negative across nations (measured on aggregate levels).  The 
within-nation positive correlation originates from the income effect on number of births.  Since 
number of children is a normal good, individuals with higher incomes choose to form larger 
families.  The across-nation negative correlation arises because different countries are in different 
stages of development.  Some variables other than per capita income affect fertility in magnitudes 
dominating over the income effect on number of births.  In our model, one such factor is the 
relative food price.  Take Britain and China from our simulation as an example.  Observing from 
Figure 13 panel (g) that, since China was lagging behind Britain in terms of development process, 
the fast relative food price drop in China occurred in the twentieth century, two centuries later than 
the British one.  This means, in the twentieth century, when Britain has entered the Modern 
Growth era and fertility declined, China had just entered its late-Malthusian or Post-Malthusian era 
in which fertility rose.  This gave rise to the negative income-fertility correlation (measured on 
aggregate levels) between Britain and China in that century.  Note that our simulation always 
generates a positive within-nation income-fertility relationship (from proposition 1).  Therefore 
our model reconciles the demographic-economic paradox between developed countries (e.g. 
Britain) and developing countries (e.g. China) in the twentieth century. 
 
7.5 Limitations 
We have abstracted the role of land from our model.  For example, we did not capture the 
fact that China possessed a larger territory than Britain throughout history.  The main reason is 
79 There were four features of EMP (Alter and Clark 2010, 48): (1) Late first marriage for women, 
typically at age 24-26; (2) High fertility rate within marriage; (3) A significant portion of women 
(10-25%) never married; (4) Low illegitimacy rates.  In particular, (1), (3) and (4) helped to keep 
average birth rates in northwest Europe low during the pre-industrial era.  De Moor and Van 
Zanden (2010) hypothesized that the increased access to employment for women after the Black 
Death set in motion for the EMP, in particular in the North Sea area relative to the Southern 
Europe.  See Dennison and Ogilvie (2014) for a scrutiny of the effect of EMP on economic 
growth. 
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for simplicity: the salient point of this paper is the interdependency between population and 
relative rise/fall of nations; our argument, that population size and composition are key to 
understanding development and divergence, is readily generalized into a theory with land size.80 
Also, similar to other unified growth models (Strulik and Weisdorf 2008, 2014), ours loses 
predictive power once a country enters the Modern Growth era.  For example, from Clark 
(2010)’s estimates, per capita income in Britain rose by a factor of 8.3 from AD1780 to AD1995.  
However, our simulation in section 6 only predicts a factor of 3.1 from AD1780 to AD2000.  
The reason is that learning-by-doing is the sole engine of growth in our model.  In reality, 
science-based innovation becomes a more important engine of growth when a country enters the 
more advanced stages of development.81  Since the late-nineteenth century there has been a 
proliferation of science-based innovations in the West, transforming the Western societies into 
knowledge-based economies and high-energy civilizations (Mokyr 1998; Vaclav 2005).  Ignoring 
innovation in our model results in underestimating economic growth in Britain and Continental 
Europe since the late-nineteenth century.82 
Last but not least, as the focus of this paper is to reconcile the emergence of the Five 
Revolutions and the Two Divergences in Eurasia, we have also abstracted away elements such as 
physical and human capital accumulation, trade and technology diffusion, institutional changes, 
and so forth, that we think are of second order importance.  These “omitted variables” are likely 
to be significant in explaining growth experience in specific nations/regions within narrower time 
horizons; for example, phases of convergence and divergence in Modern Europe (Fouquet and 
Broadberry 2015), growth acceleration during the Modern Growth era.  Understanding these 
phenomena would bring additional insights to developing and developed countries nowadays.  To 
conclude, while this paper has provided a unified growth theory to account for the relative rise and 
fall of nations/regions in Eurasia over the past two millennia, we still demand further research 
efforts in order to understand development and divergence in other time- and spatial-specific 
contexts. 
 
 
8 CONCLUSION 
 
This paper presents a unified growth theory with Industrious Selection to explore 
development and divergence in Eurasia in the past two millennia.  We first investigate the 
development process that a nation goes through.  A nation first experiences Malthusian stagnation 
because population growth dissipates slow technological progress.  As a result of conscious 
80 There is a technical issue with including land.  We have tried to include land in the production 
functions (12) and (17), and capture the difference in land size between Britain and China.  
Theoretically lowering the coordination efficiency parameter 𝑣𝑣 could replicate our qualitative 
results in section 6.  However, Matlab is unable to solve for real solution paths in low 𝑣𝑣 cases.  
Not to be burdened by the technical issue which brings only marginal contribution to this paper, 
we ignore the role of land in our model. 
81 Acemoglu et al. (2006) proposed that the importance of innovation relative to imitation as a 
source of productivity growth rises as an economy moves closer to the world technology frontier.   
82 See Ho (2016c)’s unified growth model which incorporates innovations since the Second 
Industrial Revolution (AD1870-AD1914) to reconcile French development process. 
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labor-leisure optimization and income effect on the number of births, the more industrious 
individuals, who are more hardworking and cooperative, have an evolutionary advantage over the 
less industrious ones and they gradually dominate the population composition (Industrious 
Selection).  Over time, this raises working hours, improves production efficiency and accelerates 
technological progress.  Concentration on agricultural production during the Malthusian era has 
blessed the agricultural sector with faster productivity growth, leading to the Agricultural 
Revolution.  Once agricultural productivity is high enough to feed the population, Structural 
Transformation occurs and labor hours shift to the manufacturing sector.  The manufacturing 
technological progress is relatively promoted, decelerating relative food price drop as well as 
fertility increase.  This ultimately pulls the economy out of the Malthusian Trap, marking the 
Industrial Revolution.  From then on the nation enters the Post-Malthusian era, when sustainable 
per capita income growth starts.  The Industrious Revolution also takes place as households 
supply more labor hours in response to the substantive increase in market wages since the 
Industrial Revolution.  The continuous structural transformation and the fast productivity growth 
in the manufacturing sector will eventually lead to a drop in relative manufacturing prices.  
Households will prefer to expand their consumption of cheaper manufacturing goods to giving 
birth to children, triggering the Demographic Revolution.  Then the nation will enter the Modern 
Growth era, which is characterized by long-run fertility decline. 
This paper then investigates the causes of divergence in the wealth of nations, in particular 
among Britain, Continental Europe, China and Africa, over the past two millennia.  Population 
size (Kremer 1993a; Galor and Weil 2000) and its composition (Kremer 1993b; Galor and Moav 
2002) are key to understanding this issue.  Our theory puts forward that the Black Death in 
late-Medieval Europe was more fatal to the less industrious individuals, expedited Industrious 
Selection and hence the onset of the Five Revolutions in Europe.  The Black Death toll rate was 
higher in Britain than in Continental Europe, and in Continental Europe than in China/Africa.  
Such an order of severity meant that the respective populations became conducive to growth in the 
same order, and resulted in the same wealth ordering in the Little Divergence and Great 
Divergence eras.  However, ultimately the population size will become the dominant factor in 
determining the growth of a nation.  Therefore, we observe the British economic decline relative 
to Continental Europe during the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  In the same vein, our 
theory predicts that China will embrace fast and sustainable growth in the twenty-first century and 
ultimately catch up with the European nations.  Lastly, Africa, being constrained by its population 
size and composition, has just crossed the borderline of Malthusian stagnation today.   
 Our unified growth theory (two-type household – two-sector production model with Black 
Death shock) simulates long-run development paths that are broadly consistent with British 
historical experience and the relative rise and fall of Eurasian economies (Britain, Continental 
Europe, China, Africa) in the past two millennia (Clark 2007; Maddison 2008; Broadberry 2015).  
In particular, our simulations reconcile the timings of Industrial and Demographic Revolutions in 
the four nations/regions, and replicate the emergence of East-West, North-South and 
within-Europe divergences throughout the Eurasian economic history.  
Industrious Selection points to an additional channel that generates natural selection pressure 
in human society when compared to the animal world (Darwin 1876[1872]): it is not just the most 
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adaptable humans that survive, but also the ones that are most industrious.  Reward lies ahead of 
diligence and cooperativeness, which gives individuals (or nations) superiority in terms of wealth 
and offspring dominance.  We, humans, consciously interact with other humans, the society, the 
institutions, the economy, the environment, and more factors.  We do so not just to endeavor for 
survival, but also to strive for material or normative goals subject to constraints related to the 
above factors.  How humans’ survival and maximization activities interact with 
biological-demographic and socio-political-economic elements, and shape past and modern 
economic growth in different landscapes, will always be an exciting question, and future inquiries 
into this issue will surely enrich our understanding of the nature and causes of the wealth of 
nations. 
 
 
Appendix 1: Proofs 
 
Proposition 1 
Proof:  Use (3) and (4) to rewrite (2) as 
(A.1)  𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝜎𝜎 = 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 − 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝜎𝜎, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2. 
Since 𝜎𝜎 > 0 and 𝜑𝜑2 > 𝜑𝜑1 ≥ 0 we must have 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡1 > 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡2 .  From (4), this implies 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡1 > 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡2 .  
Finally using the results 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡1 > 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡2 and 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡1 > 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡2 in the budget constraint (2), we must have 
𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡
1 < 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡2. 
 
Corollary 1 
Proof:   𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1
1
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1
= 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡1𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1
𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
1𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
1+𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
2𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
2 = 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
1+
𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
2
𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
1𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
2
> 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
1+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
2 = 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 . 
The first equality follows from (5), (6) and (7).  The third inequality follows from proposition 1 
that 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡1 > 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡2. 
 
Proposition 2 
Proof:   Part (a):  By the definition of BGP, �𝐿𝐿
2�
∗(𝐿𝐿)∗ = 0.  By 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 = (𝑣𝑣)𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡  we have (𝐸𝐸)∗ = 1. 
Part (b):  By the definition of BGP, �𝑔𝑔𝜃𝜃�
∗ = (𝑔𝑔𝜒𝜒)∗ = (𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙)∗ = 0.  Note 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = (1)𝑙𝑙1 + (0)𝑙𝑙2 in 
BGP, so (𝑙𝑙)∗ = 𝑙𝑙1 is constant. 
Constant adult population growth rate means adult population grows at (𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿)∗ in BGP.  Hence by 1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿 = 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 , in BGP (𝑛𝑛)∗ = 1 + (𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿)∗. 
Rewrite (13) as 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 ≡
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1−𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
= 𝜇𝜇[𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡(1−𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡)𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡]𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)1−𝜀𝜀  (Note 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡)𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡).  In BGP 1 = �𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
�
1−𝜀𝜀
�
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
�
−𝛼𝛼
. 
By (24), in BGP 1 = �𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
�
1−𝛼𝛼
�
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
�
−𝜀𝜀
.  Combine the above two BGP equations, we obtain (𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴)∗ = (𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿)∗.  Plug back to the first BGP equation, [1 + (𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿)∗]𝛼𝛼 = [1 + (𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿)∗]1−𝜀𝜀.  Given 
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𝛼𝛼 ≠ 1 − 𝜀𝜀, we have (𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿)∗ = 0.  Hence (𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴)∗ = 0 too. 
Next (𝑛𝑛)∗ = 1 + (𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿)∗ = 1. 
By (18), 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 ≡
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1−𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
= 𝛿𝛿[𝜒𝜒𝑡𝑡(1−𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡)𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡]𝜆𝜆𝑣𝑣(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)1−𝜙𝜙 . In BGP �𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 �1−𝜙𝜙 = �𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 �𝜆𝜆 . Since (𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿)∗ = 0 , 
given 𝜙𝜙 ≠ 1,we have (𝑔𝑔𝑀𝑀)∗ = 0. 
Define average manufacturing consumption 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 ≡
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
1𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
1+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
2𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
2
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
.  Combine manufacturing goods 
market equilibrium condition 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 = 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, (17) and (25) to yield (1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡)𝜒𝜒𝑡𝑡 = � 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1−𝜆𝜆
𝛿𝛿𝑣𝑣
(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙�
1
𝜆𝜆
.  In 
BGP 1 = �𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1
𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
�
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
�
1−𝜆𝜆
�
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
�
−𝜙𝜙
�
1
𝜆𝜆
.  By (𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿)∗ = (𝑔𝑔𝑀𝑀)∗ = 0, we have (𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚)∗ = 0. 
Given type 1 individuals are the asymptotically dominant type in the population, from 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ≡
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
1+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
2𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
2
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
 and 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 ≡
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
1𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
1+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
2𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
2
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
,  we get (𝑛𝑛1)∗ = (𝑛𝑛)∗  and (𝑚𝑚1)∗ = (𝑚𝑚)∗ .  Therefore 
�𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛
1
�
∗ = �𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚1�∗ = 0 .By 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡1 = 1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿1, in BGP we have �𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿1�∗ = 0. 
 
From (4), 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡1 = 𝛾𝛾�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡1�𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 .  Since in BGP (𝑛𝑛1)∗ and (𝑚𝑚1)∗ are constants, we have (𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝)∗ = 0. 
From (12), 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀(𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼.  In BGP (𝐸𝐸)∗, (𝐴𝐴)∗, (𝜃𝜃)∗, (𝑙𝑙)∗ and (𝐿𝐿)∗ are 
constants, hence �𝑔𝑔𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴�
∗ = 0.  Similarly we have �𝑔𝑔𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀�∗ = 0. 
By (20) and �𝑔𝑔𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴�
∗ = �𝑔𝑔𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀�∗ = (𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝)∗ = 0, we have (𝑔𝑔𝑌𝑌)∗ = 0. 
By (21) and (𝑔𝑔𝑌𝑌)∗ = (𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿)∗ = 0, we get (𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦)∗ = 0. 
By (21), (20) and (26), 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡(1+𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴+𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀(1+𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡)𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = 11+𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 �𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 ∙ 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 � =
1
1+𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
�𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
+ 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 � = 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡(1−𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡)1+𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡  .  Since (𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦)∗ = (𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙)∗ = (𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛)∗ = 0, we obtain (𝑔𝑔𝑤𝑤)∗ = 0. 
From (3), 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡1 = 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡1�𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 .  Since in BGP (𝑤𝑤)∗ and (𝑚𝑚1)∗ are constants, we have �𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙1�∗ = 0. 
Apply (A.1) in Appendix 1 to type-2 individuals, since (𝑔𝑔𝑤𝑤)∗ = 0, we have �𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚2�∗ = 0.  Then 
by (3) and (4) we also have �𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙2�
∗ = �𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛2�∗ = 0. 
By 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡2 = 1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿2 , in BGP we have �𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿2�∗ = 0. 
 
 
Appendix 2: Adjustment mechanisms in the model 
 
[Mechanism 1: Income effect]83 
83 To be more precise, in our model with heterogeneous households, mechanism 1 should be 
called the “wage effect” instead of the “income effect”. 
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Mechanism:   𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 ↑ => 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ↑, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 ↑, 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡? (↓),  𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡? (↓) 
Explanation: This operates through the household optimization channel.  Number of children and 
manufacturing goods are both normal goods in household’s utility function.  Holding relative 
food price constant, a rise in wage will relax the households’ budget constraint, and induce them to 
spend more on both goods.  Although Engel’s law holds on the individual level, it does not 
necessarily hold on the aggregate level (that all individual fractions increase does not imply 
aggregate fraction has to increase as well). 
Proof:  Consider an increase in 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡, by (A.1) from Appendix 1 we have: 
 𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
= 1(𝛾𝛾+𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖)𝜎𝜎�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝜎𝜎−1+1 > 0, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2 . 
Hence 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 ≡
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
1𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
1+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
2𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
2
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
 also increases.   
Using (2), (4), for a type-𝑖𝑖, generation-𝑡𝑡 household, fraction of income spent on food equals 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖+𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝜎𝜎
𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖+𝛾𝛾�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝜎𝜎 = 𝛾𝛾�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�1−𝜎𝜎+𝛾𝛾, which is decreasing in 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  if and only if 𝜎𝜎 < 1.  Since we 
have proved above that an increase in 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 raises 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 , the fraction of income spent on food for this 
household also decreases with wage (Engel’s law on individual level). 
Holding 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 constant, by (4) 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  moves in the same direction as 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  and increases.  Therefore 
𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ≡
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
1+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
2𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
2
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
 also increases.  By (3) 
 𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
= � 𝜎𝜎𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝜎𝜎−1
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡�(𝛾𝛾+𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖)𝜎𝜎�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝜎𝜎−1+1� − 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖�
𝜎𝜎(𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡)2 �  
with sign indeterminate.  From our simulation in section 5, this sign was found to be always 
negative in Britain throughout AD0-AD2500.   
By goods market equilibrium conditions and (4): 
 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴 = 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡1+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡2𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡1+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡2� = 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡1+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡2𝛾𝛾�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡1�𝜎𝜎+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡2�𝜎𝜎� . 
Taking total derivative of the above expression with respect to 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡: 
 
𝜕𝜕�
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴�
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
= 𝜕𝜕� 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�
𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
1
𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
1
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
+ 𝜕𝜕� 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�
𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
2
𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
2
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
 
    = �𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡1�𝜎𝜎+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡2�𝜎𝜎�−2
𝛾𝛾�(𝛾𝛾+𝜑𝜑1)𝜎𝜎�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡1�𝜎𝜎−1+1� {[𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1(𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡1)𝜎𝜎 + 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2(𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡2)𝜎𝜎]𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1 − (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡1 + 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡2)𝜎𝜎(𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡1)𝜎𝜎−1𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1} 
     + �𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡1�𝜎𝜎+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡2�𝜎𝜎�−2
𝛾𝛾�(𝛾𝛾+𝜑𝜑2)𝜎𝜎�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡2�𝜎𝜎−1+1� {[𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1(𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡1)𝜎𝜎 + 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2(𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡2)𝜎𝜎]𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2 − (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡1 + 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡2)𝜎𝜎(𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡2)𝜎𝜎−1𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡2} 
with sign indeterminate.  From our simulation in section 5, this sign was found to be always 
positive in Britain throughout AD0-AD2500.  Since 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴 = 𝛿𝛿𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙[(1−𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡)𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡]λ𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀⌊(𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡)𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡⌋𝛼𝛼 , holding 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡, 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡, 
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡, 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 constant, an increase in 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 reduces 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 (Engel’s law on aggregate level). 
 
[Mechanism 2: Relative price effect] 
Mechanism:  𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ↓ => 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ↑, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 constant, 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 constant, 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 ↑ 
Explanation: This operates through the household optimization channel.  A drop in relative food 
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price reduces child-rearing cost.  Holding wage constant, the households devote the additional 
purchasing power on raising more children.84  A greater agricultural labor hours share is required 
to meet the higher food demand. 
Proof:  Holding 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 constant, when 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 decreases, by (A.1) 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  stayed constant for all 𝑖𝑖.  By 
(4) 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  increases for all 𝑖𝑖 .  It follows immediately that 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ≡
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
1+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
2𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
2
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
 increases and 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 ≡
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
1𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
1+𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
2𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
2
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
 remains constant.  By (3) 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  also remains constant for all 𝑖𝑖 and so does 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡. 
From goods market equilibrium conditions 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡  and 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 = 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 , 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀  increases.  
Holding 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡, 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡, 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 constant, from (12) and (17) 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 increases. 
 
[Mechanism 3: Technology growth effect] 
Mechanism:   𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ↑ =>  𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 ↑  ; 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 ↑ =>  𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 ↓ 
Explanation: This operates through the wage parity channel.  Without loss of generality, consider 
the case of agricultural technological progress.  It exerts an upward pressure on agricultural wage.  
Hence labor hours shift to the agricultural sector to keep wage parity between the two sectors.  
Similar reasoning applies to manufacturing technological progress. 
Proof:  Use (12), (17), (23) to rewrite (26) as 
 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼−1 = 𝛿𝛿𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 − 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)λ−1 . 
Rewrite using the definition of 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 from (24): 
(A.2)  𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼−λ(𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼−1 = 𝛿𝛿𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙(1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡)λ−1 . 
Holding 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡, 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡, 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡, 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 constant, taking total derivative of (A.2) with respect to 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡: 
 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
= 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀−1(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼−λ(𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼−1
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼−λ(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼−2+𝛿𝛿𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙�1−λ�(1−𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡)λ−2 > 0  , given 𝛼𝛼, λ < 1. 
Holding 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡, 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡, 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡, 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 constant, taking total derivative of (A.2) with respect to 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡: 
 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
= − 𝜙𝜙𝛿𝛿𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙−1(1−𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡)λ−1
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼−λ(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼−2+𝛿𝛿𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙�1−λ�(1−𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡)λ−2 < 0  , given 𝛼𝛼, λ < 1. 
 
[Mechanism 4: Population growth effect]85 
Mechanism:   𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 ↑ =>  𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 ↓ 
Explanation: This operates through the wage parity channel.  Agricultural production is 
characterized by stronger diminishing returns to labor hours.  Ceteris paribus, an increase in 
aggregate labor hours supply exerts a greater downward pressure on agricultural wage.  This 
induces a shift of labor hours from the agricultural to the manufacturing sector, to maintain wage 
parity between the two sectors. 
Proof:  Holding 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡, 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡, 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡, 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 constant, taking total derivative of (A.2) with respect to 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡: 
84 A relative food price drop has no effect on individual household’s manufacturing goods 
consumption in our model.  The reason is that the substitution effect on manufacturing goods 
consumption is exactly offset by a relaxation on the household’s budget constraint. 
85 To be more precise, in our model with labor-leisure choice, mechanism 4 should be called the 
“labor hours growth effect” instead of the “population growth effect”. 
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 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡
= �𝛼𝛼−λ�𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼−λ−1(𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼−1
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜀𝜀(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼−λ(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼−2+𝛿𝛿𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙�1−λ�(1−𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡)λ−2 < 0  , given 𝛼𝛼 < λ ≤ 1. 
 
 
Appendix 3: Sensitivity Tests 
A) Sensitivity tests on the benchmark model 
 We perform sensitivity tests on the benchmark model (section 4, Table 2).  Table A.1 
summarizes the scenarios and test results.  In each scenario one parameter is raised by 10% above 
its benchmark value (except parameters with extreme benchmark values 𝜎𝜎, 𝜆𝜆).  The last two 
columns in Table A.1 show how the timings of British Industrial Revolution and Demographic 
Revolution are affected in each scenario.  In general the timings of the two revolutions are 
sensitive to the changes in the production function parameters (𝜇𝜇, 𝜀𝜀, 𝛼𝛼, 𝛿𝛿, 𝜙𝜙, 𝜆𝜆). 
INSERT TABLE A.1 HERE 
 
B) African “evolution policy” 
We investigate the impact of two “evolution policies” in Africa.  We extend the benchmark 
model to allow for difference in reproductive preference between the two types of individuals.  In 
particular, type 1 and type 2 individuals possess the following modified utility function: 
(1’)  𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = �𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�1−𝜎𝜎1−𝜎𝜎 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 log 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 log 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  ;  𝜎𝜎 ∈ (0,1), 𝜑𝜑2 > 𝜑𝜑1 ≥ 0, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 > 0 ; i = 1,2 , 
where 𝛾𝛾1  is not necessarily equal to 𝛾𝛾2 .  In terms of the resulting system of equilibrium 
equations, the only change to the benchmark model is that equation (4) becomes: 
(4’)  𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  ; 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2. 
We adopt baseline parameters and initial values in section 6, Table 7, with 𝛾𝛾1 = 𝛾𝛾2 = 4.95 at the 
outset.   
In the first policy P1, suppose the African government encourages the more industrious 
individuals to give more birth.  Consider this to raise the reproductive preference of the more 
industrious individuals exogenously by 10% above the initial value starting from AD2000: 
 Policy P1: 𝛾𝛾1 = 4.95 × 1.1 since AD2000. 
Figure A.1 depicts per capita income growth path of Africa under Policy P1 (dotted-dashed 
line) when compared to that of China without such a policy (dotted line).  Although Africa was 
poorer than China in AD2000, with policy P1 it would catch up with China by the end of the 
twenty-second century. 
INSERT FIGURE A.1 HERE 
Another African evolution policy with similar effect is to discourage the less industrious 
individuals to give birth.  In Figure A.2 we consider a policy P2 that hampers the reproductive 
preference of the less industrious individuals exogenously by 10% starting from AD2000: 
 Policy P2: 𝛾𝛾2 = 4.95 × 0.9 since AD2000. 
The African economy under policy P2 (dotted-dashed line) would catch up with the Chinese 
economy without such a policy (dotted line) by the mid-twenty-third century. 
43 
 
INSERT FIGURE A.2 HERE 
 
C) Robustness checks to variation in population estimates 
We consider the effects of variation in population estimates on the timings of Industrial 
Revolutions and Demographic Revolutions in Britain and Continental Europe.  We adopt baseline 
parameters and initial values in section 6, Table 5.  Table A.2 summarizes the scenarios and test 
results. 
INSERT TABLE A.2 HERE 
In scenarios 18, 19 and 20, we employ the pre-Black Death England population estimates 
from Clark (2007), Broadberry et al. (2011) and Russell (1966) in Table 8, and AD1400 England 
and Wales population from Table 4, to calculate the implied aggregate death rate in Britain during 
the fourteenth century.  In scenarios 21 and 22 the implied aggregate death rates in Continental 
Europe are respectively the lower and upper bounds of European death rates we mentioned in 
section 6.2.   
Then we use the implied aggregate death rates to recalibrate the type-specific mortality rates 
during the fourteenth century in different scenarios.  For example, in scenario 18, given the 
England population estimates of 6 million (Table A.2) and 3 million (Table 4) before and after the 
Black Death, the implied aggregate death rate in the fourteenth century Britain is 1 − 3,000
6,000 = 50%.  
From section 6.4 our model simulates 52% of type 1 individuals and 48% of type 2 individuals in 
Britain prior to the Black Death, we recalibrate the type 1 and type 2 mortality rates to be 5% and 
99% respectively to match the 50% aggregate death rate in Britain {1 − [0.52 × (1 − 5%) +0.48 × (1 − 99%)] ≈ 50%} .  Table A.3 shows the implied aggregate death rates and the 
recalibrated type-specific mortality rates for the other scenarios. 
INSERT TABLE A.3 HERE 
 The last four columns in Table A.2 show the test results.  We focus on the resulting timings 
of Industrial Revolutions in Britain and in Continental Europe.  In general, when the Black Death 
aggregate death rate was higher in Britain than in Continental Europe, our model predicts that the 
Little Divergence and the timing of Industrial Revolution would work in Britain’s favor (scenarios 
18,19 and 21).  Otherwise, the opposite would be true (scenarios 20 and 22). 
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 TABLE 1 
 
 
The Little Divergence - Britain, Continental Europe, China and Africa 
 
           per capita GDP (AD1990 international dollars) 
 
Population ('000) 
Year Britain 
Continental 
Europe 
China Africa 
 
Year Britain 
Continental 
Europe 
China Africa 
1 400 608 450 472 
 
1 800 17,800 59,600 17,000 
1000 400 427 466 425 
 
1000 2,000 17,700 59,000 32,300 
1500 714 805 600 414 
 
1500 3,942 44,250 103,000 46,610 
1600 974 898 600 422 
 
1600 6,170 56,410 160,000 55,320 
1700 1,250 996 600 421 
 
1700 8,565 60,231 138,000 61,080 
1820 1,706 1,127 600 420 
 
1820 21,239 93,320 381,000 74,236 
           Source: Maddison (2008). 
        
 
-------------------------------------- 
TABLE 2 
Benchmark parameter values, to explain the Five Revolutions 
 Interpretation Value 
Parameters   
𝜑𝜑1 Utility weight attached to leisure for type 1 individuals 1 
𝜑𝜑2 Utility weight attached to leisure for type 2 individuals 1.65 
𝛾𝛾 Utility weight attached to number of children 4.95 
𝜎𝜎 Elasticity of marginal utility with respect to 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  0.02296 
𝜇𝜇 Agricultural production function parameter 0.5 
𝜀𝜀 Diminishing returns to agricultural learning-by-doing 0.456 
𝛼𝛼 Diminishing returns to labor hours in agricultural production 0.8 
𝛿𝛿 Manufacturing production function parameter 2 
𝜙𝜙 Diminishing returns to manufacturing learning-by-doing 0.3 
𝜆𝜆 Diminishing returns to labor hours in manufacturing production 0.931 
𝑣𝑣 Coordination efficiency parameter for type 2 individuals 0.3225 
Initial values   
𝐿𝐿1
1  Initial adult population of type 1 individuals 0.00374.5  
𝐿𝐿1
2  Initial adult population of type 2 individuals 0.00774.5  
𝐴𝐴1 Initial agricultural technology level 11.95 
𝑀𝑀1 Initial manufacturing technology level 150 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
TABLE 3 
Timing of Industrial Revolution and Demographic Revolution, Benchmark model 
   
Country/Region 
Year of Industrial 
Revolution* 
Year of Demographic 
Revolution** 
Britain 1780 1820 
Counterfactual economy 2180 2200 
   * Criterion for Industrial Revolution: simulated annual per capital income growth rate > 
0.29% (see section 3.3) 
** Criteria for Demographic Revolution: simulated average fertility rate starting long-run 
decline (see section 3.5) 
 
-------------------------------------- 
  
TABLE 4 
Population estimates of Britain and other parts of Europe ('000), 
AD1300-AD1400 
   
  1300 1400 
England and Wales 5,750 3,000 
Total Europe 94,200 67,950 
Other parts of Europe         
(Total Europe excluding Britain) 
88,450 64,950 
   
Source: Pamuk (2007) Table 1. 
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TABLE 5 
Baseline parameter values in unified growth model with Black Death shock,  
to explain the Two Divergences 
 
 Interpretation Value 
Parameters   
𝜑𝜑1 Utility weight attached to leisure for type 1 individuals 1.05 
𝜑𝜑2 Utility weight attached to leisure for type 2 individuals 1.65 
𝛾𝛾 Utility weight attached to number of children 4.95 
𝜎𝜎 Elasticity of marginal utility with respect to 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  0.01 
𝜇𝜇 Agricultural production function parameter 0.5 
𝜀𝜀 Diminishing returns to agricultural learning-by-doing 0.456 
𝛼𝛼 Diminishing returns to labor hours in agricultural production 0.8 
𝛿𝛿 Manufacturing production function parameter 2 
𝜙𝜙 Diminishing returns to manufacturing learning-by-doing 0.3 
𝜆𝜆 Diminishing returns to labor hours in manufacturing production                 0.931 
𝑣𝑣 Coordination efficiency parameter for type 2 individuals 0.3225 
Initial values   
Britain 
Continental 
Europe 
 
China 
𝐿𝐿1
1  Initial adult population of type 1 individuals 0.00374.5  0.0033.35  0.003 
𝐿𝐿1
2  Initial adult population of type 2 individuals 0.00774.5  0.0073.35  0.007 
𝐴𝐴1 Initial agricultural technology level 11.95 11.95 11.950.96  
𝑀𝑀1 Initial manufacturing technology level 150 150 1500.96 
The Black Death at AD1340-AD1359 period 
    Britain – killed 0.9% of type 1 individuals and 99% of type 2 individuals 
    Continental Europe – killed 57% of type 2 individuals 
    China – no Black Death 
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TABLE 6 
Timing of Industrial Revolution and Demographic Revolution,  
Unified growth model with Black Death shock 
   
Country/Region 
Year of Industrial 
Revolution* 
Year of Demographic 
Revolution** 
Britain 1780 1820 
Continental Europe 1860 1900 
China 1960 1980 
Africa 2000 2020 
   * Criterion for Industrial Revolution: simulated annual per capital income growth rate > 
0.29% (see section 3.3) 
** Criterion for Demographic Revolution: simulated average fertility rate starting long-run 
decline (see section 3.5) 
 
-------------------------------------- 
TABLE 7 
Baseline parameter values, to explain the African Stagnation 
 Interpretation Value 
Parameters 𝜑𝜑1, 𝜑𝜑2, 𝛾𝛾, 𝜎𝜎, 𝜇𝜇, 𝜀𝜀, 𝛼𝛼, 𝛿𝛿, 𝜙𝜙, 𝜆𝜆, 𝑣𝑣 Same as those in 
Table 5 
Initial values   
𝐿𝐿1
1  Initial adult population of type 1 individuals 0.0033.51  
𝐿𝐿1
2  Initial adult population of type 2 individuals 0.0073.51  
𝐴𝐴1 Initial agricultural technology level 11.950.96  
𝑀𝑀1 Initial manufacturing technology level 1500.96 
The Black Death at AD1340-AD1359 period 
    Africa – no Black Death 
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TABLE 8 
Independent estimates for population in England before the Black Death 
       
Year   
Population  
(in millions) 
  Source 
1300 
 
5.75 
 
Pamuk (2007, 294) 
1310 
 
>6 
 
Campbell (1991, 49) 
1316 
 
6 
 
Clark (2007, 30) 
1347 
 
3.7 
 
Russell (1966, 16) 
1348   4.81   Broadberry et al (2011, Appendix 50) 
 
-------------------------------------- 
TABLE A.1  
Sensitivity tests to variation in benchmark parameters and initial values 
       
Scenario   
Change from 
benchmark model 
  
Year of Industrial 
Revolution 
  
Year of Demographic 
Revolution 
0   Benchmark   1780   1820 
1 
 
𝜑𝜑1=1*1.1  
1880 
 
1900 
2 
 
𝜑𝜑2=1.65*1.1  
1680 
 
1720 
3 
 
𝛾𝛾=4.95*1.1 
 
1480 
 
1500 
4 
 
𝜎𝜎=0.02296+0.02 
 
1620 
 
1660 
5 
 
𝜇𝜇=0.5*1.1 
 
1380 
 
1400 
6 
 
𝜀𝜀=0.456*1.1 
 
1260 
 
Nil 
7 
 
𝛼𝛼=0.8*1.1 
 
Nil 
 
Nil 
8 
 
𝛿𝛿=2*1.1 
 
2280 
 
2320 
9 
 
𝜙𝜙=0.3*1.1 
 
Nil 
 
Nil 
10 
 
𝜆𝜆=0.931+0.02 
 
1420 
 
1460 
11 
 
𝑣𝑣=0.3225*1.1 
 
1760 
 
1780 
12 
 
𝐿𝐿1
1=0.003
74.5 *1.1  1760  1800 
13 
 
𝐿𝐿1
2=0.007
74.5 *1.1  1820  1860 
14 
 
𝐴𝐴1=11.95*1.1  
1640 
 
1680 
15   𝑀𝑀1=150*1.1   1920   1960 
16 
 
Initial type 1 
proportion = 0.3*1.1  
1740 
 
1780 
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TABLE A.3 
Implied aggregate death rates and type-specific mortality rates from Table A.2 
         
    
Britain 
 
Continental Europe 
Scenario   
Implied aggregate death rates  
in the fourteenth century 
  
Type 1 
mortality rates 
Type 2  
mortality rates 
  
Type 1 
mortality rates 
Type 2    
mortality rates 
17 
 
Baseline: 48% 
 
0.9% 99% 
 
0% 57% 
18 
 
Britain: 50% 
 
5% 99% 
 
- - 
19 
 
Britain: 38% 
 
0% 79% 
 
- - 
20 
 
Britain: 19% 
 
0% 40% 
 
- - 
21 
 
Continental Europe: 25% 
 
- - 
 
0% 53% 
22   Continental Europe: 60%   - -   25% 99% 
 
Note: Aggregate death rate = 1-� 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇1 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝. % × (1 − 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇1 𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇)+ 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇2 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝. % × (1 − 𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇2 𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇)� 
 
 
 
 
  
TABLE A.2 
Sensitivity tests to variation in population estimates in Britain and Continental Europe 
         
    
Britain 
 
Continental Europe 
Scenario   Change from baseline model   
Industrial 
Revolution 
Demographic 
Revolution 
  
Industrial 
Revolution 
Demographic 
Revolution 
17 
 
Baseline 
 
1780 1820 
 
1860 1900 
18 
 
pre-Black Death, England population = 6m. 
 
1780 1820 
 
1860 1900 
19 
 
pre-Black Death, England population = 4.81m. 
 
1840 1880 
 
1860 1900 
20 
 
pre-Black Death, England population = 3.7m. 
 
1980 2000 
 
1860 1900 
21 
 
Continental Europe death rate = 25% in 
AD1341-AD1360  
1780 1820 
 
1880 1900 
22   
Continental Europe death rate = 60% in 
AD1341-AD1360 
  1780 1820   1760 1800 
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FIGURE 1A                              FIGURE 1B 
   
Note:  (Left) Agricultural output per worker (1500=1.00), England, AD1300-AD1800.  Source: 
Allen (2000) Table 8.  (Right) Agricultural productivity index (1860=100), England, 
AD1500-AD1912.  Source: Clark (2002) Table 5. 
-------------------------------------- 
FIGURE 2 
 
Note: Agricultural labor share, England, AD1381-AD1861.  Solid (blue) line: Broadberry et al. 
(2013) estimates.  Dotted (red) line: Clark (2010, 2013a) estimates.  Sources: Broadberry et al. 
(2013a) Table 9; Clark (2013) Table 2, section 7 for AD1381-AD1660 data; Clark (2010) for 
AD1680-AD1851 data. 
-------------------------------------- 
FIGURE 3A                              FIGURE 3B 
   
Note: (Left) Real wages (1860=100), England, AD1760-AD1870.  Sources: Feinstein (1998) 
Appendix Table 1, Average Full-Employment Real Earnings.  Clark (2005) Table A2, Craftsmen's 
Real Wage.  (Right) Solid (blue) line: Per capita income (1860=100), England, AD1200-AD2000.  
Dotted (red) line: Total factor productivity (1860=100), England, AD1200-AD2000.  Sources: 
Clark (2010) Tables 28, 33-34.  
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FIGURE 4 
 
Note:  Solid (blue) line: Annual working days, Britain, AD1433-AD1870. Dashed (red) line: 
Female labor-force participation rates in U.K., AD1955-AD1999.  Sources: annual working days 
from Allen and Weisdorf (2011) Table 2, which in turn based on Blanchard (1978), Clark & van 
der Werf (1998) Table 1 (we obtain AD1867-AD1870 data here), Voth (2011) Table 7; female 
labor-force participation rate from de Vries (2008) Table 6.1. 
-------------------------------------- 
FIGURE 5 
 
Note: Gross reproduction rate and Net reproduction rate, England and Wales, AD1541-AD2008. 
Source: Wrigley et al. (1997) Table A9.1 for AD1541-AD1866 data (solid lines).  Office of 
National Statistics, U.K. for AD1941-AD2008 data (dotted lines). 
-------------------------------------- 
FIGURE 6 
 
Note: Relative agricultural price, Britain, AD1270-AD1870.  Source: Broadberry et al. (2011) 
Agriculture price index divided by Industry price index. 
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FIGURE 7A                          FIGURE 7B 
   
Note: (Left) Crude birth rate and Crude death rate, England and Wales, AD1735-AD1984.  
Source: Chesnais (1992), Appendix 1 for CBR, Appendix 3 for CDR.  (Right) Percentage of 5-14 
age group in public primary schools, England and Wales, AD1855-AD1914.  Source: Flora et al. 
(1983, 624-625). 
-------------------------------------- 
FIGURE 8 
 
Note: Per capita GDP in Britain (blue solid line), France (red dashed line), Spain (orange dashed 
line), United States (light blue solid line), China (green dotted line), India (grey solid line) and 
Niger (purple dotted-dashed line) in AD1990 international dollars, AD1700-AD2008.  Source: 
Maddison (2008). 
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FIGURE 9 
Development dynamics and the Five Revolutions, Britain, AD0-AD2500 
 
 
Note: Solid (blue) lines: the benchmark economy.  Dashed (red) lines: the counterfactual 
economy, 𝜑𝜑2 = 1.3, otherwise benchmark parameters from Table 2.  Panels (a) to (f) show log of 
per capita income, average fertility rate, growth rate of agricultural productivity, growth rate of 
manufacturing productivity, average working hours, agricultural labor hours share, relative food 
price, and proportion of the more industrious individuals in population. 
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FIGURE 10 
 
Note: log of per capita GDP in Britain (blue solid line), Continental Europe (red dashed line), 
China (green dotted line), and Africa (purple dotted-dashed line), AD1700-AD2008.  Source: 
Maddison (2008). 
 
-------------------------------------- 
FIGURE 11A                           FIGURE 11B 
   
Note: Comparison of population sizes and technology levels among Britain, Continental Europe, 
China and Africa in AD0 and AD1500 (Britain levels = 1).  Sources: Maddison (2008), Comin et 
al. (2010). 
 
-------------------------------------- 
FIGURE 12 
Developmental impact of the Black Death 
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FIGURE 13 
The Black Death and the Two Divergences, Eurasia, AD0-AD2500 
 
 
Note: Solid (blue) lines: British economy.  Dashed (red) lines: Continental European economy.  
Dotted (green) lines: Chinese economy.  Parameters from Table 5.  Panels (a) to (f) show log of 
per capita income, average fertility rate, growth rate of agricultural productivity, growth rate of 
manufacturing productivity, average working hours, agricultural labor hours share, relative food 
price, and proportion of the more industrious individuals in population. 
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FIGURE 14 
The African stagnation, AD0-AD2500 
 
 
 
Note: Dotted-dashed (purple) lines: African economy.  Dotted (green) lines: Chinese economy.  
Parameters from Tables 5 and 7.  Panels (a) and (b) show log of per capita income, and 
proportion of the more industrious individuals in population. 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
FIGURE A.1 
African evolution policy P1 
 
Note: Dotted-dashed (purple) line: African economy with evolution policy P1.  Dotted (green) 
line: Chinese economy.  Parameters from Tables 5 and 7.  The panel shows log of per capita 
income evolution. 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
FIGURE A.2 
African evolution policy P2 
 
Note: Dotted-dashed (purple) line: African economy with evolution policy P2.  Dotted (green) 
line: Chinese economy.  Parameters from Tables 5 and 7.  The panel shows log of per capita 
income evolution. 
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